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Lesson 1 of 5

What has to be kept

Record keeping is the least interesting obligation in anti-money laundering and the one most often found wanting, because it is nobody's priority until somebody asks for something.

Two families of record. They are kept for different reasons and are usually held in different systems, which is the root of most of the trouble.

  • Customer records. What was obtained to identify and verify the customer and any beneficial owner: documents, data and the results of checks. Also the account files, the business correspondence, and the results of any analysis undertaken — the enhanced due diligence file, the source of wealth assessment, the risk rating and how it was reached.
  • Transaction records. Enough detail on each transaction to reconstruct it: the amount, the currency, the date, the parties, the accounts, and the instructions. The test is whether the individual transaction can be rebuilt from what you hold.

The standard is reconstruction, not storage. The point of transaction records is that a case can be put back together afterwards and, if necessary, used as evidence. A record that proves money moved but cannot say who sent it, to whom, or on whose instruction does not meet that.

Keep the reasoning, not only the result. A risk rating of "medium" with nothing behind it is a number. The useful record is the one that says what was considered and why it came out that way, because that is the part a reviewer, an auditor or an authority will actually want.

Keep what you decided not to do, too. An alert closed, a match discounted, a relationship accepted with a gap. Decisions not to act are decisions, and the file that records them is worth more than the file that quietly contains nothing.

And keep the reports. What was reported, when, about whom, with what reference. The commonest failure in a long-running case is that nobody can say what the institution has already told the authorities.

Lesson 2 of 5

How long, and from when

The headline number is simple and the detail is where institutions get it wrong.

Five years is the international standard. The FATF asks for records to be kept for at least five years, and countries apply that in their own law — in Kenya, the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act sets a seven-year period for records of transactions and related information. Where several rules apply, the longest governs.

The clock starts in different places. For transaction records, from the date of the transaction. For customer records, from the end of the relationship or the date of an occasional transaction. Those are not the same date, and a system that deletes everything five years after account opening is deleting the wrong things.

Longer, where somebody asks. Where a competent authority requires it, records must be kept longer. In practice this means that once a matter is under investigation, or a report has been made about a customer, routine deletion has to stop for that customer. Institutions that cannot suspend deletion for one customer discover the problem at the worst moment.

Deleting on time is also an obligation. Keeping personal data for ever is not caution; most data protection regimes require that it is not kept longer than necessary. A retention policy that only ever adds is as much a failure as one that deletes too soon, and it is a larger legal exposure in many jurisdictions.

Which means somebody has to own the schedule. For each category of record: what it is, which rule sets the period, when the clock starts, where it is held and who deletes it. Most institutions have this for some categories and not others, and the gaps are usually in the places records were never meant to live — shared drives, mailboxes, case notes.

And the format has to outlive the system. Records held only inside an application that is replaced in year three are records for three years, whatever the policy says.

Lesson 3 of 5

What the records are for

It is easier to keep the right things once you know who will read them, and there are four readers with different needs.

The institution itself. The next person to look at this customer needs to know what was asked, what was accepted and why. Most due diligence work is repeated because the first round left nothing behind.

Your own assurance and audit functions. They are testing whether the control worked. A decision with no recorded reasoning is untestable, so it is reported as a finding whether or not it was right.

The authorities. A financial intelligence unit analysing a report, or law enforcement building a case, needs the underlying material — and needs it to make sense without your systems and your vocabulary. Internal codes and product nicknames are not self-explanatory.

A court, eventually. Records may end up as evidence. What matters there is integrity: that the record is what it says it is, that it has not been altered, and that somebody can say where it came from and when.

Which is why alterations have to be visible. A file that can be edited without trace is weaker evidence than one where changes are recorded with who made them and when. This is not about distrust of staff; it is about being able to answer the question when it is asked.

Write for a stranger. The single most useful habit in record keeping is to write the note as if it will be read by somebody who has never heard of this customer, in two years, with no opportunity to ask you anything. That is, in fact, exactly what usually happens.

And keep them findable. A record that exists and cannot be located is, for every purpose above, a record that does not exist.

Lesson 4 of 5

The retrieval test

The obligation is not only to keep records. It is to be able to produce them, promptly, when a competent authority asks. That second half is the one almost nobody tests.

Try it before somebody else does. Pick a customer at random. Ask for everything: identification documents, verification results, the risk rating and its reasoning, the transaction history, the alerts raised and how each was closed, any reports made. Set a stopwatch. The result is usually uncomfortable and always informative.

What the test exposes. Records in five systems with no index between them. Scanned documents named by date rather than by customer. The due diligence file complete for the customer and missing for the beneficial owner. Case notes in a mailbox belonging to somebody who has left. A transaction history that stops at a system migration.

Migrations are where records go to die. When a system is replaced, somebody decides what moves. The decision is usually made on operational need, and the archive that nobody uses daily is exactly the one an investigation will want. If your transaction history begins on the day the current core system went live, say so in your risk assessment, because that is a gap.

Promptly means days, not weeks. The timescale depends on the request and the regime, but an institution that needs three weeks to assemble one customer's file will fail a request that matters, and will also be unable to answer the urgent ones at all.

Name who answers. One route in, a named owner, a deputy, and a register of what was asked, by whom, under what power, when it arrived and what was given. The register is what answers "what have we told whom" a year later.

And test the restore, not the backup. A backup nobody has restored is a hope. The same is true of archives: the question is not whether the data exists somewhere but whether anybody can get it out in a readable form.

Lesson 5 of 5

Records and personal data

Everything kept here is personal data about somebody, and two sets of rules apply at once. They are usually presented as a conflict and mostly are not.

The obligations fit together more easily than people expect. Data protection law generally allows processing that is necessary to comply with a legal obligation. Keeping anti-money laundering records is such an obligation, so the lawful basis is ordinarily straightforward — provided the institution can point to the obligation and has kept only what it requires.

"Only what it requires" does the work. Collecting more than the rules need, and keeping it under the banner of compliance, is where the real conflict arises. A due diligence file holding copies of documents nobody asked for is not more compliant; it is more exposed.

Tell people. Privacy information should say that records are kept for this purpose and for how long. Your own data protection law sets out those duties alongside the retention obligations this course describes; in Kenya, for example, that is the Data Protection Act, 2019.

Some rights are limited, and not all of them. Where a report has been made, telling the subject about it is restricted — which affects how a request for access is answered, and it is a question for the reporting officer rather than for whoever receives the request. But the restriction is narrow. It does not make the whole relationship exempt, and an institution that refuses everything on the strength of it will be wrong.

Security applies to these records like any other. They are concentrated, sensitive and attractive: identity documents, source of wealth material, account histories. The retention obligation is not a reason to hold them loosely, and a breach of a compliance archive is a serious incident in its own right.

And deletion needs the same discipline as retention. When the period ends, the record should actually go — from the archive, the backups in due course, and the shared drive where somebody put a copy. A policy that deletes the system of record while a copy survives in a mailbox has not deleted anything.

Knowledge check

Ten questions

Answer all ten questions, then check your answers. You need 9 out of 10 to pass and receive a certificate. If you score less, you will see which answers were right and wrong, and then go through the course again before you retake the check. Your answers, progress and times are kept only in this browser.

Standards and frameworks covered

The published frameworks this course teaches toward. Saolix is not affiliated with, endorsed by or accredited by any of these bodies; naming a standard is a citation, not a claim about its author.

Sources

The official documents this course relies on. Laws and guidance change, so check the current version.

  1. The FATF Recommendations (Recommendation 11), updated 2025 · Financial Action Task Force
  2. Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2009 (No. 9 of 2009) · Kenya Law
  3. Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Regulations, 2013 · Kenya Law
  4. Data Protection Act, 2019 (No. 24 of 2019) · Kenya Law
  5. Office of the Data Protection Commissioner · Office of the Data Protection Commissioner, Kenya
  6. Financial Reporting Centre · Financial Reporting Centre, Kenya
  7. Sound management of risks related to money laundering and financing of terrorism · Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank for International Settlements
  8. Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach for the Banking Sector · Financial Action Task Force
  9. Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorism Financing Guidelines · Central Bank of Kenya
  10. Guidance on the Risk-Based Approach for Managing Money Laundering Risks · The Wolfsberg Group