What suspicion actually means
Everything in this course turns on one word, and most people are taught it wrongly. Suspicion is not proof, and it is not a feeling either.
It is below proof, and above speculation. You do not have to know that money is criminal. You do not have to be able to show it. What is required is more than a vague unease: something you noticed, that you can describe, that makes you think something may be wrong.
The usual formulation is a possibility that is more than fanciful. If you can say what it is about this activity that concerns you, and that concern is grounded in something real rather than in who the customer is, you are at the threshold.
The test is whether you can finish the sentence. "This is suspicious because ———." If the sentence completes with facts, you have suspicion. If it completes with "it just feels odd", you have a prompt to go and look, not a conclusion.
Objective and subjective both count. Some rules also catch the case where you did not suspect but, on what you had, a reasonable person would have. That matters: it means not looking is not a defence.
Waiting for certainty is the common mistake. People hold on, trying to build something unanswerable. The obligation attaches to the suspicion, not to the proof, and the only party who can actually investigate is the one you have not told yet.
And the opposite mistake is just as damaging. Reporting everything that is unusual, to be safe, floods the authorities with material nobody can use and buries the cases that matter. A report with no suspicion in it is a cost, not a precaution.
One thing suspicion is never based on. Nationality, ethnicity, religion or appearance. If the sentence only completes by naming one of those, there is no suspicion — there is a prejudice, and acting on it harms somebody who has done nothing.
Terminology: the FATF standards say suspicious transaction report (STR), while the United States and the United Kingdom say suspicious activity report (SAR). They are the same filing, and this course uses whichever term its own sources use.
From alert to a decision
Most reports begin as an alert from a monitoring system, and most alerts turn out to be nothing. The work is getting from one to the other without wasting hours or missing the one that matters.
Start with the question the alert is really asking. Is there anything here that what you already know about this customer does not explain? A salary arriving on the day it always arrives, from the employer on the file, is explained. The same amount from a new payer abroad is not.
Then work in a fixed order. It wastes the fewest hours:
- What fired, and on what. Which rule, and which transactions crossed it.
- What the file says. Occupation, expected activity, the source of funds recorded at onboarding, the last review.
- What the account actually did — over a period, not only the alerting days. Three months either side turns an isolated payment into either a pattern or an outlier.
- Who the counterparties are. Names, countries, and whether they appear anywhere else.
- What the outside world says. A search costs nothing and often ends the matter.
Ask the customer only if it is safe to. Sometimes a question resolves everything. Sometimes it warns somebody. The next lesson but one covers that line; when in doubt, ask your reporting officer before you ask the customer.
Closing an alert is a decision too. Write what you saw and what explained it: "matched to the mortgage drawdown of the same date, confirmed against the lending record". Four lines. An alert closed with nothing recorded leaves the next person to redo the work and leaves the institution unable to show it looked.
And escalate on a question, not a feeling. Say what you suspect, what supports it, what is missing, and what you are asking for. "Please review" is not an escalation; it is a transfer.
Writing a report somebody can act on
Your report is read by an analyst who has never heard of your customer, does not know your institution, and has many others to get through. It is your only chance to be understood.
Two parts doing two jobs. The structured fields — names, dates of birth, identifiers, account numbers, amounts, dates, countries — are what a database matches. The narrative is what a person reads. Filling one well and the other badly wastes the report.
Get the identifiers exactly right. A transposed digit in an account number or a misspelt name can mean the report never joins the case it belongs to. This is dull and it is the part most worth checking twice.
The narrative answers four things, in this order:
- Who. The subject and every party you can name, with their role. "The payer", "the beneficiary", "the signatory who is not the account holder".
- What. What happened, in figures and dates. Not "multiple transactions over a period" but "eleven cash deposits of between 9,000 and 9,800 between 3 and 27 March".
- Why it is suspicious. One sentence that says what you think and why. This is the sentence most reports leave out.
- What you did and what is still outstanding.
Write for somebody outside your institution. Internal system names, product nicknames and scenario codes mean nothing to the reader. Nor does jargon: say what happened.
Say what you do not know. "The customer's explanation has been requested and is outstanding" is useful. Pretending to completeness you do not have is not.
And keep facts apart from inference. These are the transactions; this is the pattern; this is what I think it indicates. Collapsing the three turns a report into an assertion, and an assertion is what a recipient cannot act on.
Saying nothing, lawfully
Once a report has been made, or is being considered, what you may say about it is restricted. This is the part of the subject where ordinary helpfulness causes the most damage.
Tipping off means letting the subject know. Telling the customer a report has been made, or that one is being considered, or doing something that lets them work it out. In many jurisdictions it is a criminal offence in its own right, separate from anything the customer may have done. In Kenya it is an offence under the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act.
It is rarely a dramatic disclosure. It is a relationship manager reassuring a client that "compliance is looking at something". It is a branch explaining why a payment is delayed. It is a colleague being helpful under pressure.
What you can still say. That you cannot process a payment. That you cannot discuss the reasons. That the matter is with another team. You are not required to lie, and you must not explain.
Keep the circle small. The people who need to know are the ones who must act: your reporting officer, those handling the case, those implementing a restriction. Monitoring staff may need an account flagged; they do not need the reason. A control that requires everybody to know why cannot be operated confidentially.
It does not stop you asking the customer questions in the ordinary course, where doing so would not reveal the report. Due diligence continues. What changes is what you may explain.
If you are unsure, ask before you speak. Your reporting officer exists for exactly this, and the question costs nothing. The pressure to over-explain is always strongest when somebody is annoyed about a delay, which is precisely when the restriction matters most.
And remember who the restriction protects. Not the institution. An investigation that is warned is an investigation that fails, and money that moves while somebody is being reassured is money nobody recovers.
What happens to the relationship
A report answers one question and opens another: what now? Institutions that treat reporting as the end of the matter leave that decision to drift, which is a decision taken by nobody.
Reporting does not require ending the relationship. A report is information given to an authority. It neither obliges you to exit nor permits you to carry on exactly as before. What it does require is that somebody decides, and records the decision.
The options are three. Continue with closer monitoring; continue with restrictions on products, corridors or amounts; or exit. Each is legitimate on the right facts, and each should have an owner and a date.
Where the rules require consent, the sequence matters. Some jurisdictions let a reporting institution seek permission before proceeding with a transaction, and prohibit proceeding until it is given or a period expires. The practical effect is that the customer is waiting, the payment is not moving, and nobody may explain why — which is the situation lesson four exists for.
Do not keep an account open "to help the investigation" on an assumption. If an authority wants that, it will say so, and the file should hold what it said and who received it.
If activity continues, report again. The first report does not cover what happened afterwards. A further report should say what has changed — the volume has doubled, a new party has appeared, the earlier explanation has collapsed — rather than restating the first.
If you exit, think about where the money goes. Returning funds to where they came from is usually defensible. Sending them onward to a new destination the customer nominates may place you in the position of completing the movement you have just reported.
And write the decision down as a decision. Who decided, when, on what basis, with what conditions, and what would reopen it. That paragraph is what the next person, and the supervisor, will read first.
Ten questions
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Sources
The official documents this course relies on. Laws and guidance change, so check the current version.
- The FATF Recommendations (Recommendations 20 and 21), updated 2025 · Financial Action Task Force
- Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2009 (No. 9 of 2009) · Kenya Law
- Financial Reporting Centre · Financial Reporting Centre, Kenya
- Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units · Egmont Group
- Sound management of risks related to money laundering and financing of terrorism · Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank for International Settlements
- Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach for the Banking Sector · Financial Action Task Force
- Money laundering and terrorist financing risks · Financial Action Task Force
- Guidance on the Risk-Based Approach for Managing Money Laundering Risks · The Wolfsberg Group
- Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorism Financing Guidelines · Central Bank of Kenya
- Data Protection Act, 2019 (No. 24 of 2019) · Kenya Law



