Tax crime as a predicate offence
Tax offences became a designated category of offence in the international standard in 2012, which means tax evasion can be the crime whose proceeds are laundered. That single change is what puts this subject inside a compliance function rather than inside a tax department.
It is an unusual predicate. In most money laundering, a crime produces money that then has to be explained. In tax evasion the money was usually earned lawfully, and the offence is the failure to declare it or the false statement made about it. The proceeds are not the income; they are the tax that was not paid.
Which creates a definitional oddity worth understanding. If a trader earns income honestly and conceals it from the revenue, the amount the revenue should have received is criminal property. The rest of the income is not. In practice the two are mixed in one account, which is why the whole balance ends up in scope in many regimes.
It is almost always self-laundering. The person who evaded is the person holding and using the money, which means there is no third-party launderer to find and no payment to a criminal organisation. The laundering consists of ordinary banking by somebody with an unlawful reason to want it unexamined.
So the signals are different. There is no victim to complain, no stolen funds to trace, and frequently no unusual transaction at all. What there is instead is an inconsistency: between what a customer declares and what the account shows, or between what a business appears to do and what it reports.
The amounts are enormous in aggregate and modest individually. Tax evasion is the most widely committed financial crime in most economies, distributed across a large number of ordinary customers. That makes it unlike the typologies most monitoring is tuned for, which assume rarity.
Reporting obligations apply as they do to any predicate. Where a transaction gives grounds to suspect proceeds of tax evasion, the duty to report follows in the ordinary way. A view that tax is the revenue authority's business and not the institution's is a misreading of the standard.
And the institution has exposures of its own. Accounts used to hold undeclared funds, services sold to assist concealment, and in some jurisdictions a corporate offence of failing to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion by people acting for the firm. The risk is not only that a customer offends; it is that the institution is implicated.
The practical framing for the rest of this course. You are not being asked to assess tax. You are being asked to notice when the money in front of you is inconsistent with what the customer has told anybody, and to treat that inconsistency the way you would treat any other.
Terminology: the FATF standards say suspicious transaction report (STR), while the United States and the United Kingdom say suspicious activity report (SAR). They are the same filing, and this course uses whichever term its own sources use.
Evasion, avoidance and the boundary
Most of the confusion in this subject comes from using three words interchangeably. The distinctions matter because only one of them is a crime, and the boundary between them is where the judgement actually lies.
Evasion is dishonest. Concealing income, overstating deductions, failing to register, falsifying records, or making a false statement to the revenue. It requires dishonesty or intent and it is a criminal offence.
Avoidance is arranging affairs to reduce tax lawfully. Using a relief as intended, choosing a form of business, claiming an allowance. It is lawful, and the fact that an arrangement is tax-motivated does not make it an offence.
Between them sits aggressive avoidance, where arrangements comply with the letter of the law and defeat its purpose. Legislatures respond with general anti-abuse rules, disclosure regimes and specific counter-measures. For a financial institution the important point is that an arrangement can be unlawful as a matter of tax law without anybody having committed a criminal offence.
So what should an institution do about an aggressive arrangement? Not report it as a crime on that basis alone. Record what is known, consider whether anything suggests dishonesty or concealment rather than argument, and recognise that the reputational and conduct questions are separate from the criminal one.
The signals of dishonesty are usually concrete. Two sets of records. Invoices for services that did not occur. A declared residence that is contradicted by everything else in the file. Cash receipts absent from reported turnover. Instructions to avoid correspondence to a particular address. These are facts, not opinions about tax policy.
Negligence and error are a third category. A customer may have got it wrong, missed a filing or been poorly advised. Suspicion requires more than the possibility of error, and an institution that reports every inconsistency has lowered its own threshold to the point where its reports carry no information.
Beware of assuming the law of one country. A customer tax-resident elsewhere is subject to that jurisdiction's rules, and whether their conduct is an offence depends on law you do not know. The international standard addresses this by requiring that the predicate offence be one in the place it occurred or would be if committed at home, and the practical course is to focus on concealment rather than to adjudicate liability.
And remember the institution is not the adjudicator. The decision whether tax was owed belongs to a revenue authority and ultimately to a court. Your decision is narrower and entirely answerable: is there something here that gives grounds to suspect that funds represent the proceeds of an offence.
How it is done
Tax evasion schemes are mostly simple and repetitive. The ones that matter to a financial institution are those that leave a trace in an account.
Undeclared receipts in a cash business. Takings that never reach the declared turnover, either kept in cash or banked into an account the revenue does not know about. The signal is a deposit pattern inconsistent with reported figures, which an institution sees and the revenue does not.
A second, unmentioned account. Business receipts split between a declared account and another, sometimes in a related name or another jurisdiction. Where an institution holds both, the arithmetic is available in its own records.
False invoicing in both directions. Invoices for services never provided, to create a deductible cost and move money to a connected party; or suppressed sales invoices, to reduce declared income. The paperwork is complete because the paperwork is the point.
Trade mispricing. Goods sold to a connected party abroad at a price that places the profit in the jurisdiction with the lower rate. The transaction is real and the price is the mechanism, which makes it hard for anybody outside the group to assess.
Missing trader and refund fraud. A chain of transactions designed to claim a refund of a consumption tax that was never paid at an earlier stage, or to reclaim credits against fabricated purchases. These produce distinctive banking patterns: rapid movement between newly formed companies, round-sum transfers and sudden closure.
Payroll and contractor arrangements. Employees treated as contractors, or paid partly through loans, expenses or offshore intermediaries, to reduce employment taxes. For a bank the signal is a payroll inconsistent with the size of the business and a stream of payments to individuals described as services.
Offshore holding without declaration. An account, structure or policy held abroad and not reported to the customer's home revenue. This is the category the automatic exchange of information regimes were built for, and it is the one where a customer's self-certification of tax residence is the control.
Crypto-asset gains undeclared. Disposals generating taxable gains, with proceeds arriving in a bank account and nothing on a return. The pattern is substantial unexplained receipts from an exchange over a period in which no liability was reported.
And the simplest of all: residence that does not match life. A customer declaring residence in one country while their salary, utilities, school fees and spending all sit in another. This single comparison finds more than most rule sets, and it is entirely within an institution's own data.
What an institution can actually see
The useful material is already in the file. This lesson is about which comparisons turn it into something a reviewer can act on.
Self-certification against everything else. Under the exchange of information regimes a customer certifies their tax residence, and the institution holds an address, a telephone number, a payment pattern and a spending geography. Where the certificate contradicts the rest of the record, the institution has a conflict it is obliged to resolve rather than file.
Declared turnover against banked receipts. For a business customer the institution often holds financial statements supplied for credit purposes. Comparing the turnover in those statements with the credits to the account is one subtraction, and a persistent gap is the single clearest signal in this subject.
Costs that do not look like costs. A business whose outgoings are dominated by payments to a small number of related entities for services, with little payroll, rent or supply, is either a holding structure or an invoicing arrangement.
Refunds and reclaims. Incoming payments from a revenue authority that are large relative to the business, frequent, or followed immediately by dispersal. Genuine refunds happen; a business whose principal income is refunds is a different thing.
Round-sum and repetitive transfers between connected parties. Particularly where they cross a border and the counterparty is in a jurisdiction with a materially different rate. Pricing within a group is a legitimate exercise and a suspiciously round one is worth a question.
New companies in a chain. Several recently incorporated customers transacting with each other in large round amounts, with common directors or addresses, and short lifespans. This is the banking signature of refund fraud and it is visible as a cluster.
Consumption against declared income, for individuals. School fees, property, vehicles and travel, set against salary credits. The comparison is the same one used for corruption, and it finds undeclared income just as readily.
Correspondence preferences as a soft signal. A customer who insists that nothing be sent to their home jurisdiction, or who provides a care-of address in a third country, has a reason. It is not evidence of an offence and it belongs in the file.
And treat an unresolved conflict as a finding. Where the institution has asked, and the answer does not reconcile with its own records, the position is not neutral. Recording the question, the answer and the inconsistency is what allows a report to be made on grounds rather than on instinct.
Advisers, facilitators and the firm's own exposure
Tax evasion at any scale usually involves somebody who knew what they were doing. That creates a second subject: the people who assist, and the institution's own position when its staff or agents are among them.
Advisers occupy the whole spectrum. Most tax advice is ordinary professional work. Some is aggressive and lawful. A small amount is participation in concealment: creating the false invoice, drafting the sham contract, holding the undeclared account, or advising on how to answer the institution's own questions.
The marketed scheme is a recognisable shape. A product sold to many clients, with a fee structure based on tax saved rather than work done, documentation prepared in advance, and an instruction not to volunteer information. Where an institution sees several unconnected customers arrive with identical structures from the same adviser, it is seeing a scheme rather than a coincidence.
Introducers deserve attention for the same reason. A relationship manager receiving a stream of customers from one intermediary, all with the same profile and the same gaps in their documentation, has a pattern that belongs in a risk assessment.
Then the firm's own staff. Assisting a customer to structure around a reporting obligation, suggesting how to answer a residence question, or accepting a documented explanation known to be false are participation. Most institutions address this in training as a conflict issue; it is better addressed as a criminal one.
A corporate offence exists in some jurisdictions. The United Kingdom, for example, created offences in the Criminal Finances Act 2017 of a body failing to prevent the criminal facilitation of tax evasion by a person acting for it, covering both domestic and foreign tax. The defence is having reasonable prevention procedures, which means the control framework itself is the answer to the charge.
Which changes what the framework has to document. A risk assessment covering the ways in which the firm's own people and agents could facilitate evasion, proportionate procedures, due diligence on intermediaries, training, top-level commitment, and monitoring. That list is recognisable from bribery prevention and it is the same discipline applied to a different offence.
Agents and introducers sit inside the exposure. A person acting for the firm includes those performing services on its behalf, which brings agents, contractors and in some circumstances introducers within scope. Contractual terms about compliance are part of the answer and not the whole of it.
And the uncomfortable internal question is worth asking directly. If a member of staff wanted to help a customer conceal income, what in the current framework would stop them, and what would record that they had tried. Most firms discover that the answer is nothing and nothing.
Reporting, information exchange and the revenue
Tax matters involve a second authority with its own powers, and the relationship between the two regimes is the part most often misunderstood.
The reporting duty is the ordinary one. Where there are grounds to suspect that property represents the proceeds of criminal conduct, including tax evasion, the report goes to the financial intelligence unit in the usual form. The fact that the suspected offence is fiscal does not redirect the obligation to the revenue authority.
Automatic exchange of information is a separate, parallel obligation. Under the international standard for exchange, institutions identify account holders' tax residence, report prescribed account information to their own authority, and that information is exchanged with the authority of the residence country. This is a reporting regime about accounts, not about suspicion, and it operates whether or not anything looks wrong.
The two interact in one practically important way. The due diligence performed for exchange purposes generates exactly the conflicts described in lesson four. An institution that treats the self-certification as a form-filling exercise loses the intelligence; one that treats an unresolved contradiction as a finding has a route to a report.
Information held by a revenue authority is generally not available to you. Tax confidentiality is strong in most systems and flows one way. Expect to supply rather than receive, and do not assume that an authority's silence means it is content.
One national example, where the architecture is explicit. The Tax Procedures Act, 2015 sets out the offences of tax fraud and false statements and the Revenue Authority's powers of access and information, while the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2009 carries the reporting duty to the Financial Reporting Centre and makes the proceeds of a tax offence criminal property like any other. An institution that finds evidence of evasion reports under the second whether or not it has any contact with the first.
Mutual legal assistance and tax treaty exchange are different channels. Criminal cooperation runs through justice authorities; tax information runs through competent authorities under treaties and exchange agreements. Which channel a request arrives through tells you what it is for and who may see your answer.
Record-keeping has to satisfy both regimes. Identification evidence, self-certifications and the basis on which residence was determined, alongside the ordinary transaction and decision records. Exchange obligations have their own retention requirements and they are not always the same as the anti-money-laundering ones.
And the tipping-off rule applies as it always does. Telling a customer that their tax position has been reported is the same offence as any other disclosure, and it is easiest to commit while explaining a reporting obligation the customer has asked about.
Building the control into an existing programme
Nothing in this subject justifies a separate programme. It justifies a small number of additions to the one already running, and this lesson is what those additions are.
Put tax evasion in the risk assessment explicitly. Which customer types, products, channels and jurisdictions create exposure, and what the institution does about each. An assessment that does not mention a designated category of offence has a visible gap.
Add the comparisons to onboarding. Declared business activity against expected turnover, stated tax residence against the rest of the record, and the question of whether the customer is tax resident anywhere other than where they live. These are three fields and a reconciliation, not a new process.
Make the self-certification conflict a workflow. Where the certificate contradicts the file, somebody has to resolve it, within a time limit, with the outcome recorded. In many institutions this sits with an operations team that has no route to escalate, which is where the intelligence is lost.
Write two or three rules rather than twenty. Credits persistently exceeding declared turnover. Receipts from a revenue authority that dominate a business's income. Clusters of recently formed companies transacting in round sums with shared directors. These three cover a large share of what an institution can realistically detect.
Train on the boundary, with examples. Staff need to know that avoidance is lawful, that aggressive avoidance is not a report on its own, and that concealment is. Training that presents tax as inherently suspicious produces either paralysis or noise.
Give the function somewhere to put a soft concern. Much of what staff notice here is a remark rather than a transaction: a customer mentioning two sets of books, an adviser explaining how to answer a question. A low-friction internal route for recording such things is cheap and disproportionately useful.
Include it in quality assurance. Sample files for the reconciliation, for resolved and unresolved certification conflicts, and for the recorded basis of residence. What gets sampled gets done.
Report it upward as its own line. Alerts, reports and outcomes attributable to suspected tax offences, shown separately rather than absorbed into a total. A board that cannot see the number cannot tell whether the control exists.
And review the firm's own facilitation risk annually. The question from lesson five - what would stop a member of staff who wanted to help - belongs in a document with an owner, because in the jurisdictions that have a corporate offence, that document is the defence.
One file, followed through
A mid-sized bank. A long-standing business customer: a wholesaler of building materials, trading for eleven years, three accounts, a modest overdraft renewed annually. Nothing had ever been reported about it.
Where it started. The annual credit review required financial statements. The relationship manager noticed that the turnover in the statements was materially below the credits to the current account, and raised it because the overdraft had been sized on the statements.
The first arithmetic. Credits to the account over the year exceeded declared turnover by roughly a third. Some of the difference was explained: a loan from a director, two asset disposals, an insurance settlement. A substantial remainder was not.
What the remainder looked like. Cash and electronic receipts from a consistent group of trade counterparties, in amounts resembling ordinary sales, banked into the second of the three accounts. That account appeared in the statements as a loan account with a nominal balance.
The questions asked. The bank asked the customer to explain the difference. The customer said the second account held deposits from customers who paid in advance and that the figures would reconcile over time. The bank asked for the reconciliation. It did not arrive.
What tipped it. In a later meeting the director mentioned, without apparent concern, that the second account was used for business the accountant did not need to see. The relationship manager recorded the remark the same day in the internal log.
The decision. The bank had grounds to suspect that part of the turnover was undeclared and that the balance represented proceeds of a tax offence. It reported to the financial intelligence unit, setting out the comparison, the unanswered request and the remark. It did not tell the customer, and it did not contact the revenue authority, which was not its obligation.
The relationship. The committee decided to continue it under conditions - no increase in facilities, no new accounts, and a review in ninety days - partly because closure would have removed visibility. The overdraft was re-sized on the figures the bank could evidence rather than the ones it had been given.
What happened to the customer. A revenue enquiry followed some months later, by a route the bank was never told. The bank produced its records on request. Its own conduct was examined alongside the customer's and the file supported it.
What the bank changed. The turnover comparison became an automated check at every credit review rather than something a relationship manager might notice. The internal soft-concern log, which had existed and been little used, was mentioned in training with this case as the example. And the risk assessment acquired a paragraph on tax evasion, which it had not previously had.
The point. The detection was a subtraction performed for a credit purpose. What turned it into a report was a question that went unanswered and a remark that somebody wrote down.
Thirty questions
Answer all thirty questions, then check your answers. You need 27 out of 30 to pass and receive a certificate. If you score less, you will see which answers were right and wrong, and then go through the course again before you retake the check. Your answers, progress and times are kept only in this browser.
Your answers
Your certificate of completion
Enter your name as you want it to appear, then save the certificate as a PDF. In the print window, choose Save as PDF. A certificate is issued once per completion of the course.
Rate this course
How would you rate this course? Your rating is anonymous — just a number, with no name and no account.
Bring this to your team
Your colleagues can take this course too — it is free, needs no sign-up, and nothing they enter leaves their browser. If your institution wants the same ground covered as structured training for a team, with an instructor and your own cases, we run courses in a classroom or online for groups of ten or more.
Talk to us about training your team → See the paid courses →
Saolix does not record who takes this course, so it cannot verify these certificates. The certificate confirms completion of a free self-paced course and is not an accredited qualification.
Standards and frameworks covered
The published frameworks this course teaches toward. Saolix is not affiliated with, endorsed by or accredited by any of these bodies; naming a standard is a citation, not a claim about its author.
Sources
The official documents this course relies on. Laws and guidance change, so check the current version.
- The FATF Recommendations, where tax crimes are a designated category of offence · Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
- Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risks · Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
- Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach for Legal Professionals · Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
- Tax Procedures Act, 2015 (No. 29 of 2015, Cap. 469B), including the offences of tax fraud and false statements · National Council for Law Reporting, Kenya
- Tax Procedures Act, 2015: revised edition · Kenya Revenue Authority
- Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2009 (No. 9 of 2009) · National Council for Law Reporting, Kenya
- Criminal Finances Act 2017, Part 3, the corporate offences of failure to prevent facilitation of tax evasion · The National Archives, United Kingdom
- Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for money laundering · Official Journal of the European Union, via EUR-Lex



