What a report is for, and who reads it
Most reporting training stops at the moment the report is sent. That is the least interesting part of it. A suspicious activity report — called a suspicious transaction report, an STR, or a SAR depending on the country — is not a conclusion. It is a piece of intelligence handed to someone whose job is to put it beside other pieces you cannot see.
The financial intelligence unit. FATF Recommendation 29 asks countries to establish an FIU that serves, in the standard's own words, as "a national centre for the receipt and analysis of" suspicious transaction reports and other relevant information, "and for the dissemination of the results of that analysis". Three words in that sentence do the work: receiving, analysing and passing on. An FIU that only receives is a letterbox.
FIUs are built in one of four shapes, and the shape changes what your report can do:
- Administrative — inside a central bank, a ministry or a standalone agency. Separated from law enforcement, which makes institutions more willing to report, but it must hand cases on to act.
- Law-enforcement — inside a police or investigative body. Fast to act on a report, but institutions may hold back, feeling they are reporting straight into a criminal investigation.
- Judicial or prosecutorial — reports reach a prosecutor's office, usually in countries where investigating magistrates lead cases. Strong powers to compel, narrower analytical reach.
- Hybrid — a deliberate mixture, trying to keep the reporting relationship of one and the powers of another.
Analysis is two different jobs. Operational analysis takes one report, or a few, and builds a case: who else does this person pay, what else do we hold, is there an open investigation. Strategic analysis takes everything and looks for shape: a new technique, a corridor that has changed, a sector being used in a way nobody expected. Your report feeds both, and it feeds the second one even when it leads nowhere in the first. A report that produces no arrest is not a wasted report; it may be one of two hundred that together describe a method nobody had named.
The network. FIUs exchange information with each other through the Egmont Group, the global body of FIUs, usually on a unit-to-unit basis rather than through formal mutual legal assistance. This matters to the person writing the report: a counterparty in another country, a passport from somewhere else, an address abroad — those are the details that let an FIU ask a question internationally. A narrative that strips them out to stay brief removes the part that travels.
What this means for you. You are not deciding guilt and you are not required to establish which crime occurred. You are telling an analyst what you saw, what is odd about it, and what you hold. The test of a good report is not whether you were right. It is whether somebody who knows nothing about your customer can do something with it.
The decision to report, where the threshold actually sits
The hardest part of reporting is not writing. It is deciding.
The threshold is suspicion, not proof, and not certainty. Recommendation 20 sets the test in words worth knowing exactly: an institution that "suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity, or are related to terrorist financing" should be required to report promptly to the FIU. Two distinct tests sit in that line. Suspicion is subjective: you actually suspect. Reasonable grounds to suspect is objective: a reasonable person with the same facts would suspect, whatever you personally felt. Countries implement one, the other, or both, and the difference decides cases. An objective test means "I did not personally think it was odd" is not a defence if the facts in front of you were.
No minimum amount, and attempts count. The Interpretive Note to Recommendation 20 is unusually blunt, and again the wording is the standard's: "all suspicious transactions, including attempted transactions, should be reported regardless of the amount of the transaction". Both halves get missed in practice. Small sums are written off as not worth the paperwork — exactly the behaviour a structuring scheme relies on. And a transaction the customer walked away from, or that you refused, is often more revealing than one that completed: the customer told you what they wanted, then told you they had something to hide.
Unusual is not suspicious. This is where good analysts and weak ones separate. Unusual means it does not match the pattern: a bigger payment than before, a new country, an unexpected counterparty. Suspicious means you cannot explain it innocently once you have looked. Most unusual activity has a dull explanation — a bonus, an inheritance, a new job, a wedding, a sick relative. The work between the two is: what would make this normal, and is that true? A report that says only "the customer received an unusually large payment" has not done that work, and the analyst cannot do it for you.
Defensive reporting, and why volume is a symptom. When reporting is treated as risk transfer — when the safe choice for a compliance officer is always to file — the number of reports rises and their usefulness falls. Several consequences follow, and all of them are measurable:
- The FIU's analysts spend their time on reports with no describable suspicion, so the ones that matter wait longer.
- Institutions stop distinguishing: if everything unusual is filed, nothing filed means anything.
- Staff learn that the narrative is a formality, which is how reports come to be written for the file rather than for a reader.
The opposite failure is just as real. Under-reporting to protect a relationship, to avoid the work, or because a senior person in the business leaned on the decision, is the one a supervisor will find and the one that ends careers.
Promptly. Recommendation 20 says promptly, not eventually. The practical standard is: as soon as the suspicion is formed, not when the investigation is tidy. If you are still gathering facts after a suspicion has crystallised, you are holding intelligence that may be time-critical — an account about to be emptied, funds about to leave the country.
Writing a report an analyst can act on
An FIU analyst may read many reports in a day, about customers they have never heard of, in sectors they do not work in. The report is your only chance to be understood.
Structure that works. A report has two parts that do different jobs. The structured fields — names, dates of birth, identifiers, account numbers, amounts, dates, counterparties, countries — are what a database can match. The narrative is what a person reads. Filling one well and the other badly wastes the report. Get the identifiers exactly right: a transposed digit in an account number or a misspelt name can mean the report never joins the case it belongs to.
A narrative that analysts can use tends to answer, in this order:
- Who — the subject, and every party you can identify, with their role. "The payer", "the beneficiary", "the signatory who is not the account holder".
- What — what actually happened, in plain figures and dates. Not "multiple transactions over a period" but "eleven cash deposits of between 9,000 and 9,800 between 3 and 27 March".
- Why it is suspicious — the sentence the whole report exists for. What did you expect, what did you see, and why can the difference not be explained innocently? Name the explanation you considered and ruled out.
- What you did — what you asked the customer, what they said, what documents you were given, what you could not verify.
- What you hold — statements, identity documents, correspondence, call recordings, the trade documents. An analyst who knows what exists can ask for it.
Plain words, and no borrowed language. Write so that someone outside your institution understands it. Internal system names, alert scenario codes, product nicknames and three-letter abbreviations are invisible to the reader. Avoid copying your monitoring system's alert text into the narrative — it describes a rule firing, not a suspicion.
Say what you do not know. "The customer stated the funds were from the sale of a vehicle; no supporting document was provided" is useful. Writing it as though the explanation were established, or leaving the gap out, is not. An analyst needs to know which parts are your observation, which are the customer's assertion, and which are your inference.
The sentence most reports are missing. Many otherwise careful reports never say so what. They describe the activity and stop, leaving the reader to guess what the filer was worried about. One sentence fixes it: "The pattern is consistent with third-party cash being placed through a personal account, because the deposits are inconsistent with the declared salary and the customer could not explain the source." You are not asserting a crime. You are naming your concern so somebody can test it.
Related reports. If you have reported this subject before, say so, and give the reference. An analyst who can see that this is the fourth report on one customer in eight months is holding a different case from one who sees a single incident.
Tipping off, confidentiality, and what you may still say
Recommendation 21 does two things at once, and the second is the one people get wrong.
Protection. Recommendation 21 says institutions and their directors, officers and employees should be "protected by law from criminal and civil liability for breach of any restriction on disclosure of information imposed by contract or by any legislative, regulatory or administrative provision" where they report in good faith — and that protection holds "even if they did not know precisely what the underlying criminal activity was, and regardless of whether illegal activity actually occurred". Read that twice. Being wrong is not the risk. Reporting in good faith and turning out to be mistaken is protected; the protection is what makes the whole system possible.
Prohibition. The same Recommendation says those people should be prohibited by law from disclosing the fact that a suspicious transaction report or related information is being filed with the FIU. That is tipping off: telling the customer, or anyone else, that a report exists or is being made.
What tipping off is not. It does not require you to lie, and it does not forbid ordinary business conversation. You may ask a customer about the source of funds — that is due diligence, and often the thing that resolves a suspicion before any report is needed. You may decline a transaction. You may close a relationship. What you may not do is link any of it to a report: "I have to ask because we are filing something", or "your account is being reviewed by the authorities", or a knowing hint. The line is between asking questions and revealing that a report exists.
The exit problem. Having reported a customer, many institutions want them gone. Exiting immediately after filing is a well-known way of tipping off by implication, particularly if the customer has just been questioned. It also removes the institution's own visibility: once the customer banks elsewhere, you see nothing, and neither does the FIU through you. Some jurisdictions expect institutions to consider keeping a relationship open, and law enforcement sometimes asks for exactly that so an investigation can develop. Those requests should be documented, time-limited and approved at a level that can carry the decision — and they do not suspend your other obligations.
Consent and no-consent regimes. Several countries operate a regime in which an institution that would otherwise commit an offence by handling suspect property can seek consent — a defence — before proceeding, with the authorities having a limited period to object. Where such a regime exists it changes the timing of everything: the report is not only intelligence, it is a request for permission, and the clock matters. If you work in such a jurisdiction, know the deadlines exactly. If you do not, know that a counterparty bank abroad may be operating under one, which is sometimes why a payment stalls with no explanation.
Internal confidentiality. Tipping off is usually drafted broadly enough to cover colleagues who have no need to know. Reports should move on a need-to-know basis, and the fact that a relationship manager raised the concern does not entitle them to be told what was filed.
Does reporting work, and how anyone can tell
Reporting is the most-counted activity in anti-money laundering, and the count says almost nothing.
Volume is not a measure. A rise in reports can mean better detection, or defensive filing, or a new scenario firing badly. A fall can mean better quality, or a backlog, or fear. The number on its own cannot distinguish improvement from deterioration, which is why a supervisor who only asks how many reports you filed is asking the wrong question — and why an institution that reports volume to its board as a performance figure has built the wrong incentive.
What is actually assessed. The FATF's methodology judges countries on effectiveness as well as on technical compliance. The outcome that covers this ground asks whether financial intelligence and other relevant information are actually used by competent authorities to investigate money laundering and terrorist financing. The questions that follow are uncomfortable and useful: do reports reach the FIU, is the information good enough to analyse, is it analysed, does the analysis reach investigators, does it change what they do, and can anyone demonstrate it. A country with excellent reporting laws and an FIU nobody acts on scores badly, and should.
Feedback is the missing half. The single strongest improver of report quality is being told what happened. General feedback — typologies, examples of good and poor reports, trend reports — lets institutions calibrate. Case-specific feedback, where law allows, teaches faster than any training course. Where no feedback exists, institutions tune their reporting to what their supervisor criticises rather than to what the FIU can use, and quality drifts for years without anyone noticing.
What a good internal measure looks like. Instead of counting reports, measure things that could embarrass you:
- How long from alert to decision, and from decision to filing.
- How many reports were returned, queried, or rejected for quality, and why.
- How many came from staff escalations rather than from automated alerts — a monitoring system that produces every suspicion means nobody is looking.
- How many subjects were reported repeatedly without the relationship being reconsidered.
- What proportion of narratives contain an explicit statement of why the activity is suspicious. This one is cheap to sample and tells you most of what you need.
De-risking is a reporting failure. Where reporting and monitoring feel too hard, institutions exit whole categories of customer — money transfer businesses, charities, correspondent relationships with certain regions. The FATF has been explicit that wholesale de-risking is not a risk-based approach: it pushes activity into channels with less visibility, which is the opposite of what reporting exists to achieve. The honest version is harder and is the job: understand the customer, monitor the relationship, report what you see.
The last word on purpose. A report is a message from someone who can see one account to someone who can see many. Everything in this lesson follows from that. Write for the reader, report what you cannot explain, say what you hold, and do not mistake the number of reports you file for the contribution you have made.
From alert to case
Most reports begin as an alert, and most alerts are nothing. What happens between the two is the part institutions describe least and get wrong most often.
Triage is a decision, and it should be recorded as one. The first pass asks a single question: is there anything here that the customer's known profile does not already explain? A salary arriving on the day it always arrives, from the employer already on file, is explained. The same amount from a new payer in another country is not, and the difference is worth a sentence.
Closing an alert is also a finding. An alert closed with no note, or with "no suspicion identified", leaves the next analyst to repeat the work and leaves the institution unable to show it looked. The useful closure says what was seen and what explained it: "matched to the mortgage drawdown of the same date, confirmed against the lending record". Four lines beats four pages, and both beat nothing.
Work in a fixed order. The sequence that produces fewest wasted hours:
- What fired, and why. The scenario, its threshold, the transactions that crossed it.
- What the file already says. The expected activity recorded at onboarding, the occupation, the source of funds, the last review.
- What the account actually did. A period long enough to show a pattern, not only the alerting days.
- Who the counterparties are. Names, jurisdictions, and whether they appear elsewhere in the institution.
- What the outside world says. Open sources, and the institution's own prior cases.
- What the customer says, if asking is appropriate and will not tip anybody off.
Look at a period, not an event. A single transaction almost never establishes anything. Three months either side turns an isolated payment into either a pattern or an outlier, and the distinction is usually the whole answer.
Know what the institution already knows. The same counterparty in two unconnected cases, a previous alert closed on an explanation that has since collapsed, a related party with a report already filed. Institutions that cannot search their own case history investigate the same thing repeatedly and miss the only connections that matter.
Set a clock, and keep it. Cases left open drift, and a case that drifts for months is a decision taken by default. Whatever period the institution allows, the file should show when the case opened, what the deadline was, and what happened. Where an extension is needed, record why.
Escalate on a question, not on a feeling. The useful escalation says what is suspected, what supports it, what is missing, and what is being asked of the person it is escalated to. "Please review" is not an escalation; it is a transfer.
Building the picture
The investigation's job is to establish what the activity actually is, in terms somebody who has never seen this customer can follow. That means moving from transactions to a description.
Start from the profile, because the test is the gap. What was this account expected to do, and what has it done? A retail customer with an expected salary and household payments, now receiving twelve third-party transfers a month and sending them onward, has a gap that needs naming. Where no expected activity was ever recorded, say so: it is a due diligence finding as much as a reporting one.
Describe the shape of the money. Four questions settle most cases. Where does it come from, where does it go, how long does it stay, and what is the pattern of amounts? Funds arriving from many sources and leaving to one, within days, in amounts that avoid a reporting or review threshold, is a shape that describes itself.
The patterns worth recognising on sight. Not a checklist to apply, but the shapes that recur:
- Pass-through. Money in and out with no economic purpose visible and no balance retained.
- Structuring. Amounts arranged to sit under a threshold, often by several people or across several days.
- Third-party funding. Someone other than the customer consistently providing the funds.
- Round-tripping. Funds leaving and returning through connected parties, each leg looking ordinary alone.
- Activity inconsistent with the stated business. A consultancy receiving payments from retail individuals; a trading company whose only counterparty is a related entity.
- Sudden dormancy ending. An account quiet for years, then substantial movement, then quiet again.
Counterparties are where the case usually turns. Who are they, where are they, and do they make sense for this customer's stated business? One unexplained counterparty in a jurisdiction the customer has no connection to is worth more investigation than a hundred transactions below a threshold.
Separate what you observed from what you infer. The file should be able to say: these are the transactions, this is the pattern, and this is what I think it indicates. Collapsing the three is how a case becomes an assertion, and an assertion is what a recipient cannot act on.
Negative findings belong in the file. "The customer's explanation was checked against the lending record and matched" and "the counterparty could not be identified in any source searched" are both results. A file containing only what supports suspicion is not an investigation; it is a case for the prosecution.
Then ask whether the gap is explained. Plenty of unusual activity has an innocent explanation nobody wrote down: a house sale, a family event, a business pivot. The investigation is finished when the gap is either explained or stated as unexplained, and not before.
One report, or several
A report is a point in time, and the activity usually is not. Deciding how many reports an episode produces, and when each goes, is a judgement the policy should guide and rarely does.
Report when the suspicion is formed, not when the case is tidy. The obligation attaches to the suspicion, and waiting to build a stronger file delays the only party who can act on it. A report that says "eleven deposits, this is the pattern, the customer's explanation is outstanding" is useful now. The same report three weeks later, with the explanation attached, may be too late to matter.
Then keep reporting. Where activity continues after a report, the first report does not cover it. A further report is needed, and its value lies in saying what has changed: the volume has doubled, a new counterparty has appeared, the previous explanation has collapsed. A continuation report that simply restates the first one adds nothing and consumes an analyst's attention twice.
One subject or many. Where several customers are involved in the same pattern — the same counterparty, the same corridor, funds moving between them — the useful question is whether the recipient can see the connection. Separate reports that do not reference each other leave the recipient to rediscover the link, and they may not. Where the institution has found the connection, it should say so explicitly in each report, naming the others.
Do not bundle unrelated suspicions. The opposite failure: one report covering four customers and three different patterns because it was convenient for the reporter. It will be triaged as one thing, and three of the four subjects will effectively not have been reported.
Have a stopping rule. An account under long-term suspicion can generate a report a month indefinitely, each one adding a little. At some point the question changes from "what is the latest activity" to "why is this relationship still open", and the file should show somebody asking it. Continuous reporting on a relationship nobody will decide about is a way of transferring a decision to an authority that has not asked for it.
Record what was reported and when, where investigators can see it. The single most common failure in long-running cases is nobody being able to say what the institution has already told the authorities. The case file should hold the reference, the date, the subject and a one-line summary of each report, so the next analyst starts from what is known rather than from the beginning.
And date the suspicion, not just the report. When the suspicion was formed, and when it was reported, are two facts. Where there is a gap, the file should explain it — a weekend, an escalation, a legal question. Unexplained gaps are what a supervisor asks about first.
The relationship after a report
Filing a report settles one question and opens another: what happens to the customer now. Institutions that treat the report as the end of the matter leave that question to drift, which is a decision taken by nobody.
Reporting does not require exiting, and it does not permit ignoring. A report is information given to an authority. It neither obliges the institution to end the relationship nor allows it to carry on exactly as before. What it does require is a decision, recorded, about whether to continue and on what terms.
The options are the same three as anywhere else. Continue with enhanced monitoring, continue with restrictions, or exit. What is different after a report is that the reasoning must be written in a way that does not reveal the report to anybody who should not know of it, including colleagues outside the need-to-know group.
Where a regime requires consent, the sequence matters. Some jurisdictions allow a reporting institution to seek authority's permission before proceeding with a transaction that would otherwise be prohibited, and prohibit proceeding until it is given or a period expires. Where that applies, the operational consequence is severe and practical: the customer is waiting, the payment is not moving, and nobody may explain why. Institutions that have not thought this through in advance improvise, and improvising is where tipping off happens.
Keeping an account open on the authorities' behalf needs their agreement, not your assumption. The belief that an account should be kept open to help an investigation is common and is often wrong. If an authority wants that, it will say so, and the file should hold what it said and who received it. An institution keeping a suspicious relationship open on an unrecorded assumption carries the risk alone.
Exit without explanation is hard and lawful. Where the institution decides to exit, the reason given to the customer must not disclose the report or the suspicion. Contractual notice, the return of funds, and silence about why are the normal shape, and the file should record that the restriction on disclosure was considered and by whom.
Where the money goes is part of the decision. Returning funds to their origin is normally defensible. Sending them onward to a new destination the customer nominates may place the institution in the position of completing the movement it has just reported.
And tell the people who need to know, in a way that keeps the circle small. Monitoring teams may need the account flagged, payments staff may need an instruction, and none of them need the reason. A control that requires everyone to know why cannot be operated confidentially, which is an argument for designing the flag before you need it.
Knowing whether your own reporting is any good
Lesson 5 asked whether reporting works as a system. This asks a narrower question the institution can answer by itself: are our reports good, and how would we know.
Sample them and read them. The only reliable method is for somebody competent and uninvolved to read a sample of filed reports and score them: were the identifiers right, is the narrative comprehensible to a stranger, is the suspicion stated, is it supported, was anything material left out. Institutions that measure reporting only by count have never looked at the product.
Read the ones that were not filed, too. The more informative sample is the alerts closed without a report. That is where under-reporting lives, and it is invisible to every metric an institution normally keeps. A quality programme that reviews only what was filed audits the work that was already done carefully.
Under-reporting and over-reporting have different signatures. Under-reporting shows up as closures with thin reasoning, repeated closures on the same customer, and a scenario that never produces a report. Over-reporting shows up as reports with no stated suspicion, narratives that recite transactions without an assertion, and a rise in volume following a supervisory visit. Both are failures of judgement, and the second is usually a failure of culture: people file because filing is safe.
Defensive filing is a cost, not a safety margin. A report with no suspicion in it consumes an analyst's time at the authority and conceals the real ones in volume. It also tells you something about the institution: that the reporter did not believe a decision not to report would be supported. That is a management problem, and no amount of training fixes it while the incentive points the other way.
Ask for feedback, and record what you get. Many authorities give little, and some give useful feedback on quality or on cases that progressed. Whatever arrives should be kept, read, and fed back to the people who wrote the reports — which almost never happens. A reporter who never learns whether a report was useful cannot improve, and will default to the safe volume.
Watch the time from suspicion to filing. Measured as a distribution rather than an average, it shows where the process stalls: triage, investigation, review, approval. A long tail usually points at one approval step with one person in it.
And test the pipeline occasionally. Does a report actually reach the authority, in the format expected, with the attachments intact? The failure where reports were generated and never transmitted is not hypothetical, and nobody notices until somebody asks.
Working with the authorities
Reporting is one channel of several between an institution and the authorities, and the others are easier to handle well if somebody has thought about them before the first one arrives.
Requests for information are not reports in reverse. An authority asking about a customer is exercising a power, and the institution's job is to answer precisely what was asked, within the time given, from records it can stand behind. Two failures are routine: answering more broadly than the request allows, which may exceed what the law permits to be disclosed, and answering narrowly to the letter while knowing the request has missed something material.
Check the authority of the request itself. Who is asking, under what power, in what form, and is the person asking who they say they are. Social engineering using the appearance of law enforcement is an established technique, and a request arriving by email from an unfamiliar address asking for account detail deserves the same scepticism as any other unexpected instruction about a customer's money.
Keep a register. Every request, who asked, under what power, when it arrived, when it was answered, what was given, and who approved the disclosure. This is the record that answers "what have we told whom" a year later, and institutions without it answer that question by searching inboxes.
Production orders, freezing and restraint are different instruments. An order to produce records, an order not to move funds, and a decision by the institution to restrain its own customer are three separate things with different authorities behind them and different consequences for getting them wrong. The operational mistake is treating an informal request as if it compelled, or a compelling order as if it were optional.
Information sharing between institutions is constrained and sometimes permitted. Many jurisdictions allow sharing within a group, and some operate arrangements that let institutions share information about specific suspicions under defined conditions. The constraints are real and the permission is narrower than people assume, so the question is one for the institution's legal advisers before a conversation and not after it.
Public-private partnerships have changed what is possible in some jurisdictions, by letting institutions receive typologies and sometimes targeted intelligence from authorities. Where such an arrangement exists, the institution should know what it may do with what it receives: a typology is for tuning monitoring, while intelligence about a named person normally carries conditions.
And have one named route in. Authorities that cannot find the right person at an institution go to whoever answers, which is how a request ends up with a branch. One published contact, monitored, with a named deputy, removes a whole class of failure.
One worked example, end to end
A retail customer. Salaried, with the same employer for six years, an account that has done the same thing every month for all of it. A scenario fires on cash deposits.
The alert. Eleven cash deposits between the equivalent of 9,000 and 9,800, over 25 days, at four different branches. The scenario that fired was looking for deposits clustered below the reporting threshold. Triage asks the one question: does the known profile explain this? The profile is a salary and household payments. It does not.
The investigation, in order. The scenario and its threshold, recorded. The file: occupation, expected activity at onboarding, the last review. The account over five months, not just the alerting days — which shows the deposits are new, with nothing comparable before. The counterparties: the deposits are cash, so there are none on the way in, but the money leaves in six transfers to one beneficiary in another country, each within two days of a deposit cluster. Open sources on the beneficiary name return a company in freight forwarding. The institution's own history: no prior alerts, no related reports.
The shape, named plainly. Cash in at four branches in amounts below the threshold, out to a single foreign beneficiary within days, nothing retained. That is pass-through with structuring on the way in, and it is inconsistent with a salaried customer's stated profile.
Asking the customer, and deciding not to. The relationship manager suggested calling. The decision, recorded, was not to: the pattern was sufficient to form a suspicion, and a question about specific deposits would have risked tipping off. Note that this is a judgement, not a rule, and the file says who made it.
The report. Filed four days after the alert, before the picture was complete. The identifiers were checked digit by digit. The narrative said who, then what in figures and dates, then why it is suspicious in one sentence: eleven cash deposits below the threshold at four branches, moved onward to a single foreign beneficiary, by a salaried customer whose account has never done this. What was outstanding was stated as outstanding.
Then the activity continued. Two further clusters in the following six weeks, to a second beneficiary. A further report went, saying what had changed rather than restating the first, and naming the first report's reference.
The relationship. Reviewed after the second report. Restricted — no further outbound international payments — then exited on contractual notice, with the funds returned to the depositing branches' own record rather than onward. The customer was told the bank was ending the relationship, and not why. The file records that the disclosure restriction was considered and who advised.
What the quality review found later. Two things: the four-branch pattern would have been caught a month earlier by a scenario the institution had switched off for noise, and the gap between suspicion and filing was four days, of which three were an approval queue with one person in it.
Fifty questions
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Standards and frameworks covered
The published frameworks this course teaches toward. Saolix is not affiliated with, endorsed by or accredited by any of these bodies; naming a standard is a citation, not a claim about its author.
- FATF — The FATF Recommendations (Recommendations 20, 21 and 29), Explanatory Materials on Recommendations 18 to 23 (reporting and tipping-off), Methodology for Assessing Technical Compliance and the Effectiveness of AML/CFT Systems, Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach for the Banking Sector, FATF Guidance on the Risk-Based Approach and De-risking, Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach: Effective Supervision and Enforcement, Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment Guidance, Opportunities and Challenges of New Technologies for AML/CFT
Sources
The official documents this course relies on. Laws and guidance change, so check the current version.
- The FATF Recommendations (Recommendations 20, 21 and 29) · Financial Action Task Force
- Explanatory Materials on Recommendations 18 to 23 (reporting and tipping-off) · Financial Action Task Force
- Methodology for Assessing Technical Compliance and the Effectiveness of AML/CFT Systems · Financial Action Task Force
- The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units · Egmont Group
- Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach for the Banking Sector · Financial Action Task Force
- FATF Guidance on the Risk-Based Approach and De-risking · Financial Action Task Force
- Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach: Effective Supervision and Enforcement · Financial Action Task Force
- Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment Guidance · Financial Action Task Force
- Concealment of Beneficial Ownership (joint FATF and Egmont Group study) · Egmont Group
- Opportunities and Challenges of New Technologies for AML/CFT · Financial Action Task Force



