What customer due diligence is for
Customer due diligence (CDD) — the work most of the industry calls KYC, a phrase that appears nowhere in the FATF standards — is how a regulated business answers three questions about each customer: who are you, who is really behind you, and what will you use us for? The answers are the baseline against which everything the customer does later is judged. A transaction is only unusual if you know what usual looks like for that customer.
The international standard is set by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Its Recommendation 10 describes four CDD measures:
- Identify the customer and verify that identity using reliable, independent documents, data or information.
- Identify the beneficial owner, the person who ultimately owns or controls the customer, and take reasonable measures to verify who they are. For companies and trusts, this includes understanding their ownership and control structure.
- Understand the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship, and obtain information on it where appropriate.
- Conduct ongoing due diligence: keep watching the relationship and the transactions in it, and keep the information up to date.
Under the same Recommendation, CDD is required when a business relationship is established; for occasional transactions (one-off transactions for someone with no ongoing relationship with you) above a set threshold (USD/EUR 15,000 in the FATF standard) and for certain occasional wire transfers; whenever money laundering or terrorist financing is suspected; and when there are doubts about whether identification data obtained earlier is true or adequate.
These duties reach you through national law, not from the FATF directly, and almost always through three layers at once: an anti-money-laundering statute, regulations made under it, and the rules of your sector supervisor, such as a central bank or a conduct authority. Identify all three for your own country before you apply anything in this course, because national rules may be stricter than the FATF standard and it is the stricter rule that binds you. Kenya is one example: its 2023 Regulations require CDD for occasional or one-off transactions without setting any threshold (regulation 14(5)), where the FATF standard allows a threshold. Check specifically whether your own rules remove a threshold, lower one, or add a customer type.
If CDD cannot be completed, the FATF standard is not to open the account, start the relationship or carry out the transaction, or to end an existing relationship, and to consider a suspicious transaction report (STR; the United States and the United Kingdom call the same filing a suspicious activity report, or SAR). Some countries turn that into a firm duty rather than a judgement. Kenya's 2023 Regulations (regulation 25) are one example: if a customer does not provide evidence of identity as soon as reasonably practicable, the institution must not open the account or carry out the transaction, must end any relationship already started, and must report it to the financial intelligence unit. They also allow the institution to stop the CDD and report instead, where continuing would alert the customer to the suspicion. Read your own rules for this point in particular, because the difference between "consider reporting" and "must report" decides what you do on the day.
Finding the real owner
Criminals rarely open accounts in their own names when a company, trust or nominee will do it for them. That is why CDD looks through the customer to the beneficial owner: the natural person, always a human being, who ultimately owns or controls it, or on whose behalf a transaction is carried out.
For a company, the work usually runs in three steps:
- Ownership: who holds shares or voting rights above the threshold that applies. Thresholds differ by country and by rule book, so use the one that binds you.
- Control by other means: who can appoint the board, direct decisions or otherwise control the company without holding many shares.
- Senior managing official: where no person qualifies under the first two steps, identify, and take reasonable steps to verify, the person who holds the position of senior managing official, such as the chief executive, and record why no owner was found. This person is a fallback; it does not mean they own the company.
Ownership can pass through several layers of companies, sometimes in different countries. Follow each layer until you reach people. Recommendation 10 requires you to identify the beneficial owners and take reasonable measures to verify them, and to understand the customer's ownership and control structure; national regulations put that duty into words you are held to. In practice it means obtaining documents such as the certificate of incorporation, details of directors and shareholders, and, for a trust, the trust deed. An official search from your national company registry is the usual starting point, because it is the one document in the file that did not come from the customer.
Warning signs include structures that are more complex than the business needs, nominee shareholders or directors with no clear reason, bearer shares, and reluctance to explain who is behind the company.
Many countries now keep beneficial ownership registers, and require companies to keep their own register and lodge it centrally within a set number of days of any change. The percentage test differs by country and the FATF fixes none: the United Kingdom's people-with-significant-control rules use more than 25% of shares, and separately of voting rights, while Kenya's use at least 10%. Every version also catches control by other means, such as the right to appoint or remove the board, so a holding below the percentage is not the end of the question. Find your own country's register, its threshold and its filing deadlines. And remember what a register is: it records what companies declared. Registers support your checks; they do not replace them.
Timing, trusts and relying on someone else
Three practical questions come up in almost every onboarding, and none of them has an obvious answer: when must verification actually be finished, who counts as the owner of a trust, and what happens when somebody else has already done the checks.
When verification happens. The default is strict: verification of the customer and the beneficial owner takes place before the business relationship is established or the transaction is carried out. European law states it that way in Article 14(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/849, and it reflects the international standard.
There is one narrow exception. Verification may be completed during the establishment of the relationship where that is necessary so as not to interrupt the normal conduct of business, and where there is little risk of money laundering or terrorist financing. Even then, it must be completed as soon as practicable after initial contact. Read the conditions carefully, because they are narrower than they are often treated: this is not a grace period available by default, and it is not available where risk is higher. Firms that use it normally restrict what the account can do until verification is finished, which is practice rather than a rule in the text.
Existing customers are not exempt. The same Article requires CDD measures to be applied not only to all new customers but at appropriate times to existing customers on a risk-sensitive basis, including when the customer's circumstances change. A file opened years ago and never looked at since is a gap, not a saving.
Trusts are a list of roles, not an owner. Looking for a single beneficial owner behind a trust is the wrong question. For a trust, the people to identify are the settlor; the trustee or trustees; the protector, if there is one; the beneficiaries, or, where the individuals who will benefit have not yet been determined, the class of persons in whose main interest the arrangement is set up or operates; and any other natural person exercising ultimate control over the trust, by direct or indirect ownership or by other means. The class option exists because a discretionary trust may genuinely have no identified beneficiary yet.
Relying on someone else. A firm may rely on a third party, such as an introducer or another regulated firm, to have identified the customer, identified the beneficial owner and understood the purpose of the relationship. One sentence governs the whole arrangement: the ultimate responsibility for meeting those requirements remains with the firm that relies on the third party. The conditions follow from that. The third party must apply customer due diligence and record-keeping consistent with the Directive and be supervised accordingly; reliance on third parties established in high-risk third countries is prohibited; and the relying firm must obtain the necessary information and be able to obtain copies of the identification and verification data immediately on request. The introducer does not lose its own obligations either, including reporting suspicions and keeping records, where it has its own relationship with the customer.
Reliance is also not the same as outsourcing. Where the work is done on your behalf by an agent or a service provider, it is your own compliance, performed by someone else's hands.
A note on dates. The articles above are Directive (EU) 2015/849, which applies today. Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 replaces much of this framework and applies from 10 July 2027, with 10 July 2029 for a few categories of business, so anyone citing the Directive after that date should check the correlation table in the Regulation. The underlying pattern is older than either and is unlikely to move: verify first, keep the exceptions narrow, treat a trust as a set of roles, and never let reliance become a transfer of responsibility.
Rating customer risk
The risk-based approach comes from FATF Recommendation 1: countries, and the businesses they regulate, must identify, assess and understand their money laundering and terrorist financing risks, and apply measures in proportion to them. For each customer, it means working out where risk is higher and spending your effort there, rather than treating every customer the same.
FATF groups risk factors by customer, geography, and products, services, transactions or delivery channels. Many firms score delivery channel separately, so a customer risk rating usually combines four groups of factors:
- The customer: their type (individual, company, trust, charity), occupation or business, whether they are a politically exposed person (a PEP: someone who holds or has held a prominent public function, such as a minister, senior judge or senior military officer, or a family member or close associate of such a person), and anything adverse known about them.
- Geography: where they live, are incorporated and do business, and where their money comes from and goes, including countries the FATF lists as having strategic deficiencies (its "high-risk jurisdictions subject to a call for action" and "jurisdictions under increased monitoring"). Kenya itself has been under FATF increased monitoring since February 2024; check the FATF website for its current status.
- Products and services: how easily each can be used to move value quickly, anonymously or across borders.
- Delivery channel: whether the relationship was opened face to face, remotely or through an intermediary.
Each factor is scored, and the scores combine into an overall rating such as low, medium or high. The method matters as much as the result:
- Write it down: the factors, the weights and the reasons.
- Allow a documented override, so an analyst can raise a rating when something does not fit the model.
- Test it: check that high-risk customers really are rated high, and that the model is not quietly rating everyone as low.
A risk rating is not a verdict on the customer. It decides how much due diligence and monitoring the relationship needs.
When to do less, and when to do more
The rating drives the depth of due diligence.
Simplified due diligence may be allowed where lower risk has been identified through an adequate analysis of risk, for example with financial institutions supervised under strong AML rules, or companies listed on a stock exchange with rules on disclosing their ownership, if the law where you operate permits it. It means lighter measures, not none. It is never allowed where there is a suspicion of money laundering, terrorist financing or proliferation financing (financing weapons of mass destruction), or where specific higher-risk scenarios apply. National rule books generally repeat those limits; Kenya's 2023 Regulations (regulation 21) are one example.
Where risk is higher, the Interpretive Note to Recommendation 10 (paragraph 20) requires enhanced CDD measures — that is the standard's own term. Enhanced due diligence (EDD) is the industry's name for the same work, and the one this course uses, but the two are not interchangeable when you are citing a source. For foreign politically exposed persons (PEPs) and their family members and close associates, Recommendation 12 is more specific again: in addition to normal CDD it requires systems to identify PEP status, senior management approval, reasonable measures to establish source of wealth and source of funds, and enhanced ongoing monitoring. For domestic PEPs and people with prominent functions in international organisations, those measures apply where the relationship is higher risk. National rule books generally follow that approach; Kenya's 2023 Regulations (regulation 26) are one example. Enhanced measures are required as well for relationships and transactions with people, companies and financial institutions from countries for which the FATF calls for them: that is Recommendation 19, and it is the one place the FATF itself does say "enhanced due diligence". Almost every country mirrors R.19 somewhere in its own law, so find the section that does. Typical EDD measures include:
- establishing the source of funds (where the money in this relationship comes from) and the source of wealth (how the customer came to have their overall wealth);
- obtaining more information about the customer and the intended relationship;
- getting senior management approval before starting or continuing the relationship;
- monitoring more often and more closely.
EDD should actually answer the question it raises. A payslip does not explain a deposit a hundred times the customer's salary; a sale agreement or an inheritance record might.
Higher risk does not mean automatic refusal. FATF has warned against de-risking, closing whole categories of customers without assessing each one, because it can push people and money out of the regulated system altogether. Decide customer by customer, and record why.
Keeping it current
CDD is not a one-off check at onboarding. Customers change: a small trader grows into an exporter, a company changes owners, a customer becomes a politically exposed person. Ongoing due diligence keeps the picture accurate.
- Periodic reviews, with frequency set by risk: for example high-risk customers reviewed more often than low-risk ones, under a schedule your policy defines.
- Trigger events that prompt an immediate review: a change of ownership or control, a new country or product, transactions that do not fit the customer's profile, adverse media (negative news reports about the customer), or a new sanctions or PEP match.
- Transaction monitoring that compares activity with what the customer said they would do. Unexplained differences are a reason to ask questions, and possibly to report.
Records matter as much as the checks. Keep what you obtained and why you decided what you did. Recommendation 11 sets the international floor at five years after the relationship ends or the transaction was completed, and national law often requires longer: Kenya, for example, requires at least seven, and allows its financial intelligence unit to require longer still. Work to whichever period is longer where you are, and find out whether your supervisor can extend it. Good records let you show a supervisor or court that your decisions were reasonable at the time you made them.
When a review reveals something you cannot resolve, escalate it, normally to your Money Laundering Reporting Officer (MLRO). That may mean EDD, restricting the account, exiting the relationship or filing a suspicious transaction report. Recommendation 20 requires reports to reach the financial intelligence unit promptly, but it sets no number of days: the deadline is a national choice, and a short one is common. Kenya, for example, allows two days from when the suspicion arose. Find your own deadline and count it in working days or calendar days as your law states, because that detail decides whether a report is late. Separately, Recommendation 21 is the basis for the tipping-off rules: do not tell the customer that a report is being considered or made. In most countries that is a criminal offence, not a matter of policy.
Identifying is not verifying
Two words are used interchangeably in conversation and mean different things in the rules, and the difference is where most weak files come from.
Identification is collecting the claim. The customer tells you their name, date of birth, address and identity number, or hands over a document saying so. At this point you have a claim and nothing more.
Verification is establishing that the claim is true, using reliable, independent source documents, data or information. The three words that matter are reliable, independent and source — independent meaning not produced by the customer for this purpose.
Which is why a utility bill is weak evidence of an address. It is a document the customer can produce, often editable, and nothing in it was checked by anybody. Compare it with a check against an electoral register, a credit reference file or a government database, where somebody else recorded the information for their own reasons.
Documents and data are both acceptable, and they fail differently. A document can be forged or belong to somebody else. A database check can match the wrong person with a common name, or be built on records that were themselves never verified. Using both, where the risk justifies it, is how one covers the other.
Check that the person is the document's owner, not only that the document is real. A genuine passport proves somebody exists. It does not prove the person in front of you, or at the other end of a video call, is that somebody. That is a separate step, done by comparing a live image with the document, by a check against a database the person must answer for, or in person.
Expiry, legibility and names. An expired document does not verify a current identity. A photograph of a photograph usually cannot be assessed at all. And names vary legitimately: married names, patronymics, transliterations, name order. A mismatch is a question, not a refusal, and the answer belongs in the file.
Record what you relied on and why. Not "ID verified" but which document or source, when it was checked, by whom, and what it showed. A file saying verification was done, without saying how, cannot be reviewed by anybody — including you, in two years, when somebody asks.
Customers that are not people
Most of the difficulty in onboarding is not individuals. It is companies, partnerships, trusts, clubs and the sole trader who is somewhere between the two.
A company has two files inside one. The entity itself — that it exists, where, under what number, what it does — and the people connected to it: owners, directors, and whoever is authorised to operate the account. Both have to be done, and the second is the one that gets skipped.
What evidences existence. The register entry rather than a certificate the customer supplies, because a register can be checked independently and a certificate is a document somebody handed you. Also the registered address, the current directors, and the filed accounts where there are any. A company whose filings are years overdue is telling you something about itself.
Authority to act is separate from ownership. Who may give instructions on the account, up to what limit, and on whose authority? A board resolution or a mandate establishes it. Accounts operated for years by somebody whose authority nobody can evidence are commoner than anyone expects, and are the gap that fraud uses.
Partnerships depend on the partnership deed. Who the partners are, who may bind the firm, and what happens when one leaves. For professional firms, the client account question also arises: money held for clients is not the firm's money, which affects what you are actually looking at.
Clubs, societies and associations rarely have owners in the ordinary sense. The useful questions are who the officers are, what the constitution says about who may operate the account, and how funds are raised. Small community bodies are legitimate and often disorganised, which is a reason to be patient rather than suspicious.
A sole trader is an individual. There is no separate legal person, so the due diligence is on the person, plus evidence of the business: registration where required, premises, the activity itself.
And in every case, ask what the entity is for. A company with no employees, no premises and no filings, whose account is expected to receive substantial third-party payments, is a structure rather than a business. The question is not whether that is prohibited — it is not — but whether there is an explanation, and whether it holds.
When it cannot be completed
Every programme meets customers whose due diligence cannot be finished. What the rules require then is specific, and it is the part most often handled by letting the file sit.
The requirement is to stop. Where the required measures cannot be completed, the business should not open the account, begin the relationship or carry out the transaction — and should consider terminating an existing relationship. That is the standard, and it is not discretionary in the way the depth of due diligence is.
And to consider a report. The same standard says that failing to complete due diligence should prompt consideration of a suspicious transaction report. Not an automatic report: consideration, recorded. The inability itself is information, and sometimes it is the only signal you will get.
Distinguish cannot from will not. A customer who has lost documents in a fire, or who comes from a system that issues none, has a problem you can often work around with secondary evidence and a recorded decision about its limits. A customer who declines to explain an ownership chain is making a choice. Treating the two identically loses honest customers and keeps the other kind.
Do not let it drift. The common failure is an account opened on a promise that something will follow, which never does, and which nobody revisits because the relationship is now ordinary. If completion is allowed after opening in limited circumstances, there must be a date, an owner, and a consequence when it passes.
Exiting is not the same as refusing. Ending an existing relationship raises notice, contractual terms and where the money goes. Returning funds to their source is usually defensible; sending them onward to a destination the customer nominates may not be.
And say nothing about why, where a report is involved. The restriction on tipping off applies to the exit conversation. You can say you are unable to continue the relationship. You cannot say what prompted it.
Record the decision as a decision. What was required, what could not be obtained, what was tried, what was decided, by whom, and whether a report was considered. A file that simply stops, with the last entry being a request nobody answered, is the one that will be found at an inspection.
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Standards and frameworks covered
The published frameworks this course teaches toward. Saolix is not affiliated with, endorsed by or accredited by any of these bodies; naming a standard is a citation, not a claim about its author.
- FATF — The FATF Recommendations (International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation), Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach: The Banking Sector (2014), Guidance on Beneficial Ownership of Legal Persons (March 2023), FATF clarifies risk-based approach: case-by-case, not wholesale de-risking (2014), Guidance: Politically Exposed Persons (Recommendations 12 and 22)
National detail, by market
This course teaches the international standard and one worked example. The national detail for a market sits in its own pack, so it can be kept current without reopening the course: Japan.
Sources
The official documents this course relies on. Laws and guidance change, so check the current version.
- The FATF Recommendations (International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation) · Financial Action Task Force
- Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach: The Banking Sector (2014) · Financial Action Task Force
- Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2009 (No. 9 of 2009) · Kenya Law
- Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Regulations, 2023 (L.N. 153 of 2023) · Kenya Law
- Summary guidance for companies, register of people with significant control · Department for Business and Trade and Companies House, United Kingdom
- Guidance on Beneficial Ownership of Legal Persons (March 2023) · Financial Action Task Force
- FATF clarifies risk-based approach: case-by-case, not wholesale de-risking (2014) · Financial Action Task Force
- Guidance: Politically Exposed Persons (Recommendations 12 and 22) · Financial Action Task Force
- Guidance to Reporting Institutions on Suspicious Transaction and Activity Reporting (2025) · Financial Reporting Centre, Kenya
- Directive (EU) 2015/849, Articles 14, 25, 26 and 27 and Article 3(6)(b) · EUR-Lex (consolidated text)
- Regulation (EU) 2024/1624, Article 90 (application from 10 July 2027) · EUR-Lex



