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Lesson 1 of 6

What these programmes are

Two different things are often spoken of as one, and the difference matters.

Citizenship by investment (CBI). Citizenship, and therefore a passport, granted in exchange for an investment. Processing can be quick, and some programmes require little or no physical presence in the country either before or after. The applicant becomes a national of a state they may never have lived in.

Residency by investment (RBI). A residence permit granted for an investment, sometimes renewable, sometimes a route to citizenship after a period. Far more common, far more varied, and often attached to genuine conditions — minimum stay, tax residence, business activity.

The usual investment routes. A non-refundable contribution to a government fund; purchase of real estate above a threshold; government bonds; investment in an approved business; or job creation. Real estate is the route that appears most often in financial-crime discussion, because it combines the programme with the laundering vehicle discussed in the real estate course.

Why states run them. For small states a programme can be a material share of government revenue — and for some, the largest single source of foreign currency. For larger economies the aim is usually inward investment, talent or regional development. These are legitimate policy objectives, and the FATF and OECD's joint 2023 study of the misuse of these programmes is explicit that it examines how they can be misused, not a claim that they are inherently illegitimate.

The intermediary industry. A substantial private market sits between applicants and governments: agents, promoters, law firms, marketing companies, and in some cases organisations given a formal role in processing. Their incentives are to complete applications. Where a programme depends on intermediaries both to find applicants and to vet them, the conflict of interest is structural rather than occasional.

The scale point, stated carefully. Dozens of countries operate one or other kind of programme, and the number of people obtaining nationality or residence this way each year runs well into the tens of thousands. The great majority are ordinary investors, retirees, business people and families seeking mobility, tax planning, security or education for their children. That is the baseline against which any risk judgement has to be made — and the reason the last lesson ends where it does.

Lesson 2 of 6

What a second passport actually buys a criminal

The risk is specific and mechanical. It is worth setting out exactly what changes, because that determines what an institution should look at.

A new name, with no history attached. Several programmes permit or facilitate a change of name on naturalisation, and even without one, a name transliterated differently into a new document is effectively a different string. Screening systems match strings. A new nationality and a new spelling can therefore produce a clean sanctions, PEP and adverse-media result for a person with a long record under their former name — without anything being forged.

A different nationality to present. Nationality drives country risk, and sometimes drives whether enhanced measures apply at all. A person from a jurisdiction that attracts scrutiny can present a passport from one that does not. The underlying facts — where they live, where their money is, where their business is — have not changed.

A new claim of tax residence. This is the OECD's particular concern. Automatic exchange of financial account information depends on a customer self-certifying their tax residence, and on institutions applying due diligence to that claim. A residence or citizenship obtained with little or no physical presence can be used to assert residence in a low-tax jurisdiction that will exchange little or nothing with the person's actual home country. The scheme need not be fraudulent in itself for the use to be.

Travel. Visa-free or visa-on-arrival access to many countries, which matters for moving in person, for opening accounts abroad, and for leaving ahead of an investigation.

Distance from the home jurisdiction. Some states do not extradite their own nationals. Acquiring a nationality can therefore place a person beyond reach while an investigation runs — and in several documented instances, programmes have been used precisely at the moment pressure built at home.

Obscured status. A new nationality can put distance between a person and their status as a politically exposed person or their connection to a sanctioned party, not by changing the facts, but by changing the identifiers through which an institution would discover them.

What it does not buy. It does not change who the person is, where their wealth came from, or what they have done. Every one of the mechanisms above works on identifiers, not on substance — which is why the counter-measures are about establishing substance.

Lesson 3 of 6

The risks, named precisely

Identity and customer due diligence (CDD, which much of the industry calls KYC). The core problem: which nationality do you hold, and have you been told about the others? A customer may hold two or three nationalities and present the most convenient. Four practical consequences:

  • Screening against one identity misses records attached to another.
  • A recently issued passport carries no history, and nothing in it discloses how it was obtained.
  • Place and date of birth, which is the most stable identifier a person has, is sometimes the only link between the two identities — and it is often the field institutions capture least carefully.
  • Where a name was changed on naturalisation, the connection may not be discoverable from documents at all.

Tax transparency circumvention. A self-certified residence that reflects a purchased status rather than a real life. The signals are mundane and checkable: an address that is an agent's office or a property the customer does not occupy; a tax identification number from a jurisdiction with no income tax; residence claimed in one country while salary, pension, family and spending all sit in another.

Sanctions exposure. A new nationality does not lift a designation — designations attach to persons, not to passports. But it can make a designated person harder to find in screening, and it can support travel and account opening. The risk is detection failure rather than legal escape.

Politically exposed person risk. A programme can be used by officials, their families and their associates to place wealth and themselves outside a home jurisdiction. The real estate route is the most common, and it brings together three things covered elsewhere in this set: PEP status, property, and corporate ownership.

The investment itself as placement. Where the required investment is several hundred thousand or several million, and the source of those funds is weakly examined, the programme is the laundering step. The money enters a government fund or a property purchase with official sanction, and emerges as a lawful investment by a new national.

Programme integrity risk. Weak vetting, reliance on self-declaration, no check with the applicant's home jurisdiction, no physical presence requirement, name-change facilitation, no revocation power, and no published statistics. Each is a reason to treat a nationality from that programme as weaker evidence about a person — which is a statement about the programme, not about the holder.

Lesson 4 of 6

What to ask, and what to check

At account opening.

  • Ask for every nationality and every travel document, and record them all. Not "your nationality" but "do you hold any other nationality or residence permit, and may we see those documents?" This single question is the highest-value control in the whole topic.
  • Capture place and date of birth accurately, and treat them as the primary identifier. They survive a change of name and a change of nationality.
  • Establish where the person actually lives. Not the address on the document: where they sleep, bank, pay utilities, send children to school and spend. Divergence between claimed residence and economic life is the central finding in tax-residence misuse.
  • Ask how and when the nationality or residence was obtained. A recently acquired nationality is not suspicious in itself and is an entirely ordinary thing to ask about. The answer tells you which programme, which year, and therefore what the vetting was likely to have been.
  • Establish source of wealth, and source of the investment. If a programme required half a million, that money came from somewhere, and whoever assessed it may have had every incentive not to look. Treat it as you would any other large sum entering the relationship.
  • Understand the intermediary. Who introduced the customer, and are they an agent for a programme? An introducer paid per completed application is not a source of comfort.

In screening.

  • Screen all names, spellings and transliterations, and all nationalities, not the primary record alone.
  • Re-screen on any change of name, nationality or document, and treat such a change as a trigger event rather than a data update.
  • Where a customer's nationality changed, screen the former identity too, for as long as records permit.

On review.

  • A change of nationality or residence during a relationship deserves a documented look, not a field update. It is one of the few customer events that alters the evidence underlying every earlier conclusion.
  • Where a relationship was accepted partly on the basis of a nationality, and that nationality came from a programme since criticised or suspended, that is a reason to revisit.

One caution about sources. Lists circulate ranking programmes by risk, often produced by firms selling either the programmes or screening services. Prefer the official material: the joint FATF and OECD study, a country's own published programme rules and statistics, and mutual evaluation findings on the jurisdiction concerned.

Lesson 5 of 6

When the programme changes under you

Everything so far has treated a programme as a fixed thing to judge. It is not. Programmes are tightened, suspended and struck down, and an institution is left holding files opened under the old rules. That is the problem practitioners actually meet, and it is handled badly almost everywhere.

A programme can be found unlawful. On 29 April 2025 the Court of Justice of the European Union gave judgment in Commission v Malta (Case C-181/23) on Malta's 2020 investor citizenship scheme. The Court recalled that each member state is free to set the conditions under which it grants or withdraws its nationality, but held that the freedom must be exercised in compliance with EU law. Granting nationality, and so automatically Union citizenship, "in direct exchange for predetermined investments or payments through a transactional procedure" amounts to the commercialisation of the grant of nationality, which the Court found infringes Article 20 TFEU and the principle of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU. Note what the Court's press release does not address: nothing about citizenships already granted, and nothing about residence-by-investment.

A programme can be tightened instead. The five Eastern Caribbean citizenship-by-investment states — Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Christopher (St Kitts) and Nevis, and Saint Lucia — agreed six principles with the United States in February 2023: no country processes an applicant denied by any of the other five; applicants are interviewed as part of due diligence; each is subject to additional background checks with the relevant financial intelligence unit; audits; retrieval of revoked passports; and suspension of applications from Russian and Belarusian nationals. An agreement establishing a regional regulator, the Eastern Caribbean Citizenship by Investment Regulatory Authority, was signed in September 2025, enacted in all five countries, and expected to become operational during 2026.

What either kind of change means for your file. Three things follow, and the third gets missed:

  • Vetting standards have a date. A nationality granted in 2019 was vetted to the 2019 standard. The passport does not record which standard, so the year of acquisition is a fact about the evidence, not a biographical detail.
  • Reform does not reach backwards. Interviews introduced in 2023 tell you nothing whatever about a document issued in 2018.
  • A programme being closed or ruled unlawful rarely invalidates the status already granted. So the question is not whether the passport is valid — it almost certainly is — but what was established about this person at the time it was issued, and by whom.

And the trap in the other direction. A reformed programme is better evidence going forward. It is not an all-clear, and no substitute for establishing residence, source of wealth and prior identity yourself.

So record three fields, not one. Which programme, which year, under which rules. Those three let you re-ask the question when a programme's standing changes — and over a long relationship, it will.

Lesson 6 of 6

Judging a programme, and judging a person

What stronger programmes have in common. The joint study's direction of travel, and the features worth asking about:

  • Vetting that does not rely on the applicant. Independent verification, with more than one body involved, and checks that are not performed by the intermediary who is paid to complete the application.
  • Contact with the applicant's home and former jurisdictions. The single most informative check available, and the one most often absent. A criminal record certificate supplied by the applicant is not the same as an enquiry made of the authorities.
  • A genuine presence requirement, or at least a recorded connection to the country, which gives the status substance and creates something to verify later.
  • No facilitation of name change on naturalisation, and recording of former names in the issued document or the national record.
  • Source of funds examined to a financial-institution standard, by someone with no stake in approval.
  • Transparency: published rules, published numbers, published refusals, and a register accessible to competent authorities.
  • Revocation, with the legal power and the practical willingness to withdraw status obtained by deception — and a channel to inform other countries when it happens.

Now the other half, and it matters as much. Most people holding a purchased citizenship or residence are not criminals. They are business people wanting mobility, families wanting safety or schooling, retirees, and investors doing something entirely lawful that their own government permits and another government sells.

So the correct posture is not to treat a nationality as a red flag. It is to recognise that a document from a weakly governed programme is weaker evidence than the same document from a strong one — and that the response to weaker evidence is to establish the facts another way: other nationalities, real residence, source of wealth, screening across all identities. That is more work, and it is the right work.

Refusing a category would be the familiar mistake. Declining everyone who holds a particular passport repeats de-risking, with the same outcomes: legitimate people excluded, the risk displaced rather than reduced, and the institution left with no view of anything. It would also be a poor risk judgement, because the person a programme was misused by is precisely the person with the resources to find another route.

What to take away. These programmes work on identifiers — name, nationality, declared residence. Every control that works in this area works by establishing substance instead: where someone actually lives, where the money actually came from, and who they have actually been.

Knowledge check

Twenty questions

Answer all twenty questions, then check your answers. You need 18 out of 20 to pass and receive a certificate. If you score less, you will see which answers were right and wrong, and then go through the course again before you retake the check. Your answers, progress and times are kept only in this browser.

Standards and frameworks covered

The published frameworks this course teaches toward. Saolix is not affiliated with, endorsed by or accredited by any of these bodies; naming a standard is a citation, not a claim about its author.

Sources

The official documents this course relies on. Laws and guidance change, so check the current version.

  1. Misuse of Citizenship and Residency by Investment Programmes (November 2023) · FATF and OECD
  2. Misuse of Citizenship and Residency by Investment Programmes (OECD edition) · Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
  3. The FATF Recommendations (Recommendations 10, 12, 19 and 22) · Financial Action Task Force
  4. Guidance: Politically Exposed Persons (Recommendations 12 and 22) · Financial Action Task Force
  5. Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach for the Real Estate Sector · Financial Action Task Force
  6. Concealment of Beneficial Ownership (joint FATF and Egmont Group study) · Egmont Group
  7. FATF Guidance on the Risk-Based Approach and De-risking · Financial Action Task Force
  8. Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach for the Banking Sector · Financial Action Task Force
  9. Methodology for Assessing Technical Compliance and the Effectiveness of AML/CFT Systems · Financial Action Task Force
  10. Commission v Malta (Citizenship by investment), Case C-181/23, judgment of 29 April 2025 — press release 52/25 · Court of Justice of the European Union
  11. EC countries with Citizenship by Investment Programmes participate in roundtable (the six CBI principles) · Government of Saint Lucia
  12. Fourth US-Caribbean Roundtable on Citizenship by Investment (regional regulator and governance) · St Kitts and Nevis Information Service