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Lesson 1 of 8

What corruption money looks like when it arrives

Nobody deposits a bribe. Proceeds of corruption reach a financial institution dressed as something ordinary, and the whole of this subject is learning to recognise the costume.

It usually arrives as a payment for services. A consultancy fee, an advisory retainer, a commission, a success fee, a marketing agreement. The invoice is real, the contract exists, and the service is either trivial or absent. This is the single most common presentation because it is the easiest to document.

Or as the revenue of a real business. A construction company, a supplier of medical equipment, a transport contractor. The company trades, pays staff and files accounts. Some of its revenue is a public contract obtained or priced corruptly, and that money is indistinguishable from the rest once it is inside.

Or as a loan, a gift or an inheritance. Instruments that explain wealth without explaining income. A loan from a connected company that is never serviced, a gift from a relative with no visible means, an inheritance that cannot be evidenced.

The person is frequently not the official. A spouse, a child at university abroad, a brother-in-law who owns the contracting company, a long-standing business partner. Looking only at the officeholder finds a salary and a modest account, which is exactly what it is designed to find.

And the geography is deliberate. Funds move to a jurisdiction with a different language, a different legal system and no interest in the politics of the first. The structure in between is the subject of the course on legal arrangements; here the point is that distance is purchased on purpose.

Scale varies enormously, and so should your expectations. A procurement official taking a percentage on local contracts produces flows of a size that fit a retail account. A minister with control over a licensing regime produces flows that need a corporate structure. The controls that catch one will not see the other.

The asset side often tells you first. Property, vehicles, school fees, medical treatment abroad, and luxury goods are where the money ends up, and they are visible in payments long before anybody reconstructs the source.

Which is why the useful question is proportion, not legality. Nothing in the paragraphs above is unlawful on its face. The question that works is whether what this person or business receives is plausible given what they do, and the answer requires knowing what they do in enough detail to be surprised.

Lesson 2 of 8

The offences, and who commits them

Corruption is not one offence. The distinctions matter because they determine what the money looks like, who is holding it and what evidence exists.

Bribery is a transaction. Something of value given or offered to influence an official act, and the receiving of it. There are two sides and usually two sets of records, which is why bribery schemes are more often exposed from the payer's accounts than the recipient's.

Embezzlement is a removal. Public funds taken by a person entrusted with them. Here there is one actor and the money appears without a counterparty, which makes the receiving account the whole of the evidence.

Procurement fraud is a pricing exercise. The contract exists and is performed, at a price that includes a margin for the people who awarded it. Nothing is missing from the store; the state simply paid more than it needed to, which is why it is the hardest to detect from inside the public body.

Abuse of office and trading in influence cover the rest. A decision taken for private benefit, an approval granted, a licence issued, a case dropped. The value may never pass through a bank at all, arriving instead as a job, a share in a company, or a property transferred at an undervalue.

Illicit enrichment reverses the question. Some regimes make it an offence for a public officer to hold assets disproportionate to their known income, which places the explanation on the officer. For a financial institution this is useful framing even where it is not the law: a disproportion is itself a reportable concern.

The actors fall into recognisable roles. The official with the decision. The intermediary who arranges and takes a cut. The company that pays and receives the contract. The family member who holds the asset. The professional who builds the structure. A file that identifies only the first of these has not identified the scheme.

Grand and petty corruption are different problems for you. Large-scale state capture produces flows through corporate structures and correspondent relationships. Everyday extortion at a counter produces cash that never enters a formal account. Most financial institutions can only ever see the first, and should not design controls as though they will see the second.

And political exposure is a proxy, not a category of guilt. A politically exposed person is somebody whose position creates opportunity and therefore risk. The framework exists because position is observable and conduct is not, which is both its usefulness and its weakness.

Lesson 3 of 8

Procurement, where most of it happens

Public procurement is the largest single channel for corruption proceeds in most economies, because it is where the state hands money to the private sector in large amounts under rules that can be bent.

Single-sourcing is the first signal. A contract awarded without competition, on grounds of urgency, security or proprietary technology. Each ground is sometimes genuine. A supplier who wins repeatedly on urgency has not been lucky.

Specification capture is subtler and more effective. The tender is competitive, and the requirements describe one supplier's product. Nothing in the award is irregular because the work was done before the tender was published.

Then the price. Comparison against market rates, against other counties or regions, against the same item bought elsewhere by the same body. Inflated unit prices are the mechanism by which the margin is created, and the arithmetic to find them is usually available and rarely done.

Change orders and variations are where the money is added later. A contract won at a competitive price is varied upward after award, repeatedly, for reasons documented thinly. The original award survives scrutiny; the variations are where the value went.

Advance payments deserve their own attention. Money paid before performance, to a company incorporated recently, with no track record and a bank account opened for the purpose. Where the performance never happens, the advance was the point.

Subcontract layering moves value outward. The prime contractor is substantial and reputable. A subcontract for an unexplained share of the work goes to a company connected to someone who mattered in the award. The prime's accounts look normal.

Beneficial ownership is the question that resolves most of it. Who owns the supplier, and are they connected to the person who awarded the contract. This is why procurement regimes increasingly require disclosure of ownership and of conflicts, and why the register of a company bidding for public work deserves more than a formality check.

One national example, where the framework is explicit. The Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, 2015 prohibits corrupt, collusive and fraudulent practices and conflicts of interest in procurement, makes contravention an offence, and provides for debarment of offenders. The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003 and the Anti-Bribery Act, 2016 supply the offences, with the latter requiring public and private entities to report suspected bribery to the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission within twenty-four hours.

For a bank, the practical signal is the counterparty mix. An account whose receipts are substantially from public bodies, whose balance is withdrawn promptly, and whose owner appears nowhere in a public register is the pattern worth a look, and it is identifiable from payment data alone.

Lesson 4 of 8

Political exposure, and why status is not enough

The politically exposed person framework is the main control most institutions have for this risk, and it under-performs for reasons worth understanding rather than complaining about.

It is a risk category, not an accusation. The requirement is to identify such customers, obtain senior approval, establish source of wealth and funds, and conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring. None of that implies wrongdoing, and the framework fails when staff treat it as a finding and either avoid applying it or apply it apologetically.

The definition reaches further than the office. Family members and close associates are included because that is where assets are held. An institution that screens the official and not the spouse, the adult children or the long-term business partner is screening the one person unlikely to hold anything.

State-owned enterprises are frequently missed. A board member or senior executive of a state-owned company often falls within scope, and these roles are far more numerous than ministerial appointments, less well covered by commercial data, and closer to procurement decisions.

Domestic exposure is where the real volume is. A framework built to flag foreign officials will see almost nothing in a market where the risk is local. The international standard distinguishes foreign from domestic, with different minimum requirements, and a risk-based programme in any country should be stronger on its own officials than the minimum suggests.

Data quality is the practical constraint. Commercial lists are incomplete, out of date in both directions, and strongest exactly where the risk is weakest. Local knowledge, declarations, public registers of interests, and asking the customer are all part of the answer.

Leaving office does not end the risk. The standard does not set a fixed expiry; the question is whether the person still presents higher risk, which depends on the office held, the time elapsed and what remains under their influence. Automatic de-flagging after a year is a policy choice that should at least be a deliberate one.

Source of wealth is the control that actually works here. For a public official the known income is a matter of record, often published. The useful exercise is comparing it with what the account receives and holds, and that comparison is arithmetic rather than judgement.

And senior approval has to mean something. A sign-off by somebody who has read the file, with reasons recorded, and a review date. A tick applied in bulk at the end of a month is worse than nothing, because it creates a record implying consideration that did not occur.

Lesson 5 of 8

Intermediaries and the people who make it work

Corruption at scale needs professionals. The intermediary layer is where the arrangement becomes documentable, and where an institution has its best chance of seeing it.

The agent or consultant is the classic vehicle. A company retained to assist with a market, paid a percentage of contract value, delivering advice nobody can describe. The payment is lawful on its face and the contract is drafted to be. What gives it away is the proportion: a fee that is a large share of the contract, contingent on the award, paid to a party with no capacity to perform.

Success fees deserve the hardest look. A payment due only if a decision goes a particular way aligns the intermediary's interest with the decision rather than with the work. Where the decision is a government one, that is the structure of a bribe with an invoice.

Watch the family-owned supplier. A business owned by relatives of an official, bidding for work in the official's sector. Nothing in the ownership is concealed, because nobody asked. Connection is usually discoverable from public information and almost never checked.

Lawyers and accountants appear in two different roles. Giving advice, which is protected and legitimate. Holding money, forming companies and acting as nominees, which is not advice and should be treated as the service it is. A client account that receives public-sector payments and disburses them onward is performing a banking function with a professional's name on it.

Political contributions and sponsorships sit in an awkward place. Lawful in most systems, regulated in some, and a route by which value reaches a decision-maker's interests without reaching the decision-maker. The test is whether the payment is proportionate, disclosed and consistent with the payer's stated purpose.

Employment and opportunity are forms of payment. A job for a relative, a scholarship, a directorship, a share allocation, a property sold at an undervalue. None of these moves money to the official and all of them are consideration.

Facilitation payments are not a safe category. Small payments to speed routine services are prohibited outright in some regimes and tolerated in none that matter for a financial institution's risk assessment. A customer who describes them as normal has told you about their control environment.

And the correspondent relationship carries other people's exposure. A bank providing services to a respondent in a higher-risk market inherits the quality of that respondent's controls over politically exposed customers. The questions to ask are about the respondent's framework, not about individual names.

Lesson 6 of 8

What the data shows

Most corruption cases that are found by a financial institution are found in payment data, by somebody who noticed a proportion that did not make sense.

Public-sector receipts into a private account. Payments from a government body, a county, a ministry or a state-owned enterprise, into an account whose business does not obviously supply them. This is the single most direct signal available and it is identifiable from the payer name.

Receipt followed immediately by dispersal. Money arrives and leaves within days, split between several parties, often including an individual. A supplier paid for work keeps money to pay costs; a conduit does not.

Round amounts and repeated identical payments. Genuine commercial invoices are rarely round. A sequence of identical large payments described as consultancy is a fee schedule, not a trading pattern.

Growth that outpaces capacity. A company whose turnover multiplies within a year while its staff, premises and assets do not. The accounts will show it and so will the payroll running through the account.

Payments to jurisdictions with no commercial logic. Not merely offshore, but unconnected: no supplier, no customer, no operation there. The pattern matters more where the counterparty is a company with a professional's address.

On the asset side, look at consumption. School fees abroad, medical payments, property purchases, vehicle finance, premium insurance. Where consumption exceeds any plausible income, that is the disproportion the whole subject rests on, and it is in the statements.

Adverse media is a genuine input if used honestly. An allegation is not a finding, and it is information. The useful discipline is to record what was found, what it was about, whether it was corroborated, and what was decided, so that the next reviewer is not starting again.

Cash is the signal in the other direction. For a public officer, cash deposits exceeding salary are the simplest form of the same arithmetic, and they are frequently explained as rental income or family support without any evidence being sought.

Build the comparison, not just the alert. The reason corruption detection fails is rarely that the data is absent. It is that nobody has set an expectation for what this customer should look like, so there is nothing for the actual figure to be inconsistent with.

Lesson 7 of 8

Reporting, recovery and cooperation

Finding it is the start. What follows involves authorities, other jurisdictions and timescales measured in years, and understanding that shapes what an institution should do on day one.

Report on suspicion, to the right body, in the right form. In many countries the financial intelligence unit receives suspicious transaction reports (STRs; the United States and the United Kingdom call the same filings suspicious activity reports, or SARs) while a separate anti-corruption authority investigates the underlying offence. Knowing which obligation runs to which body, and whether both are engaged, is part of the procedure rather than something to work out during an incident.

One national example splits the roles, and gives one of the duties a deadline. Suspicious transaction reporting under the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act runs to the Financial Reporting Centre. The Anti-Bribery Act, 2016 separately requires public and private entities to report suspected bribery to the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission within twenty-four hours of becoming aware of it. The second duty is a different test, a different recipient and a much shorter clock than most institutions have designed for.

Freezing is usually quicker than confiscation and rarely immediate. An institution may hold funds under a court order, a statutory power or an instruction from an authority. What it cannot generally do is freeze indefinitely on its own initiative, and the gap between a report and an order is a period that needs a decision about whether to continue the relationship.

Asset recovery is slow and often incomplete. Tracing across jurisdictions, mutual legal assistance requests, proof to a court's standard, and a claim contested by well-funded lawyers. The published experience of recovery initiatives is that the sums returned are a small fraction of the sums taken, which is an argument for prevention rather than a reason for pessimism.

Non-conviction-based confiscation changes the arithmetic in some regimes. Where the state can proceed against property rather than against a person, the absence of a conviction is not the end, which matters when the officeholder is abroad or protected.

Your records are the evidence. Account opening documents, identification evidence, the source of wealth file, the transaction history, screening results and the decisions taken with reasons. In corruption cases these are produced years later to a court, and the institution's own conduct is examined alongside the customer's.

Expect requests from other jurisdictions. Information held in one country is frequently needed in another, and the channels are formal. Knowing who in the organisation handles a mutual legal assistance request, and how quickly, converts a bottleneck into a process.

And decide the exit question deliberately. Ending a relationship may protect the institution and may also destroy the visibility an investigation depends on. The decision belongs to a senior person, with the reasons recorded, because both choices are defensible and only an undocumented one is not.

Lesson 8 of 8

One case, followed through

A commercial bank in a market with substantial public spending. A relationship manager opens an account for a newly incorporated construction and supplies company. This is the ordinary version of what follows.

The opening. Two shareholders, both individuals, no trading history, an expected turnover described as moderate. Source of funds stated as shareholder capital. Nothing in the application was unusual and the account was opened within the normal service standard.

Month four. Receipts of several times the stated expected turnover, all from two county governments, described as supply of medical equipment. Balance withdrawn within a week of each receipt, split between a hardware supplier, a transport company and two individuals.

What the analyst noticed. Not the amounts, which were plausible for a supplier, but the proportion going to individuals and the absence of anything resembling costs: no payroll, no rent, no tax payments, no import duties for equipment that would have had to be imported.

The first enquiry. The bank asked for the contracts and invoices. They were produced, in order, bearing the county's references. The equipment had been delivered, according to the documents, in quantities and at unit prices the bank had no way to assess.

What the screening added. One of the two individuals receiving the onward payments shared a surname and address history with a county official in a procurement role. The connection was available from public information and had not been looked for at onboarding because the customer was a company and the official was not its shareholder.

What the bank did. It filed a suspicious transaction report with the financial intelligence unit, and because the pattern suggested bribery it also considered the separate reporting duty to the anti-corruption authority, which in this jurisdiction carries a twenty-four hour clock. It did not tell the customer. It referred the relationship to a committee, which set conditions: no further onward payments to individuals without documentary explanation, and a review in sixty days.

What happened next. The customer objected to the conditions, made two further large onward payments to a third individual, and then asked to close the account. The bank retained the records, reported the closure, and provided the file when it was requested fourteen months later.

What changed at the bank. Expected turnover became a monitored figure rather than a form field, with an alert where receipts exceeded it by a multiple. Accounts whose receipts were substantially from public bodies were made a category with their own review. Connection screening at onboarding was extended to directors and shareholders of corporate customers against public interest and procurement data, not only sanctions and media.

The point. No document was forged and no rule was broken by the bank. The case turned on one analyst asking why a supplier had no costs, and on a connection that public information would have shown to anybody who had thought to look before the money moved.

Knowledge check

Thirty questions

Answer all thirty questions, then check your answers. You need 27 out of 30 to pass and receive a certificate. If you score less, you will see which answers were right and wrong, and then go through the course again before you retake the check. Your answers, progress and times are kept only in this browser.

Standards and frameworks covered

The published frameworks this course teaches toward. Saolix is not affiliated with, endorsed by or accredited by any of these bodies; naming a standard is a citation, not a claim about its author.

Sources

The official documents this course relies on. Laws and guidance change, so check the current version.

  1. United Nations Convention against Corruption · United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
  2. The FATF Recommendations, Recommendations 12 and 22 on politically exposed persons · Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
  3. Specific Risk Factors in the Laundering of Proceeds of Corruption, assistance to reporting institutions · Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
  4. Politically Exposed Persons: A Guide on Preventive Measures for the Banking Sector · Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative, World Bank and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
  5. The Puppet Masters: How the Corrupt Use Legal Structures to Hide Stolen Assets · Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative, World Bank and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
  6. Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003 (No. 3 of 2003) · National Council for Law Reporting, Kenya
  7. Anti-Bribery Act, 2016 (No. 47 of 2016), including the duty to report suspected bribery within twenty-four hours · National Council for Law Reporting, Kenya
  8. Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, 2015 (No. 33 of 2015), including section 66 on corrupt and collusive practices · National Council for Law Reporting, Kenya
  9. Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2009 (No. 9 of 2009) · National Council for Law Reporting, Kenya
  10. Bribery Act 2010 · The National Archives, United Kingdom