How it actually gets in
Ransomware is not a clever piece of software that appears from nowhere. It is the last step of an intrusion that usually began in one of a small number of ordinary ways.
Stolen or guessed credentials. The most common route. A password reused from another site, one guessed because it was weak, or one phished. If remote access is exposed to the internet and protected by a password alone, the attacker does not need an exploit — they log in.
Unpatched internet-facing systems. A vulnerability in a remote access gateway, a file transfer appliance or a mail server, known and fixed by the vendor, still running unpatched. Attackers scan the whole internet for these within days of a fix being published, because the fix tells them what to look for.
Phishing and malicious attachments. Still effective, now usually as a first foothold rather than as the ransomware itself.
Through somebody else. A supplier, a managed service provider, or a piece of software updated from a compromised source. One intrusion reaching many organisations at once.
Then they do not encrypt anything for a while. The gap between getting in and the ransom is often days or weeks. In that time the attacker looks around, works out what the organisation does, finds the backups, takes administrative control, and copies data out. The encryption comes last, when they have already decided what will hurt most.
Which is the most useful thing to understand about it. There is a long period during which the intrusion is present and detectable, and most victims had something in their logs that would have shown it. Ransomware is rarely a bolt from the blue; it is an intrusion nobody noticed until the note appeared.
What a modern attack does
The picture most people carry — files locked, pay for the key — is a decade out of date and leads to the wrong preparations.
Encryption is now only one of the pressures. Attackers assume you may have backups, so they bring other leverage.
Data theft, and the threat to publish. Before encrypting, they copy out what looks valuable: customer records, contracts, personal data, source code, email. Then the threat is not only that you cannot work but that your customers' data will be published. This is why backups alone do not solve the problem: restoring a system does not un-steal anything.
Attacking the backups first. Modern attacks deliberately find and destroy or encrypt backups before anything else, which is why the question is never "do we have backups" but "are they reachable from the network that will be compromised".
Pressure on other people. Contacting customers, partners or regulators directly to tell them their data has been taken. Pressure applied through those who will complain to you.
Disruption as leverage. Timed for a month-end, a holiday, or a reporting deadline, because the cost of being down is what sets the price.
And an industry behind it. Ransomware is largely a service business: one group builds the software and takes a cut, others break in and deploy it, specialists sell access they have already obtained. That is why the same tooling appears across unrelated victims, and why the people who get in are often not the people who wrote anything.
The consequence for planning. An organisation that prepares only to restore files has prepared for a third of the problem. The other two thirds are a data breach and a business interruption, and they need different plans and different people.
The controls that actually work
The useful list is short, and it is boring, which is why it is so often incomplete.
Multi-factor authentication on everything reachable from outside. Remote access, email, administrative consoles, the management interfaces of anything cloud. This single control removes the most common entry route, because a stolen password stops being enough on its own.
Patch the internet-facing things first, and quickly. Everything else can follow a normal cycle. The edge — gateways, file transfer appliances, mail servers — is what gets scanned within days of a fix being published.
Backups that an attacker with your administrator password cannot reach. Offline, or in a separate account with separate credentials, or immutable for a defined period. And tested by restoring, because a backup nobody has restored is a hope rather than a control.
Limit who holds administrative rights, and how. Most intrusions become disasters at the point where the attacker obtains domain-wide administrative control. Separate administrative accounts, used only for administration, with multi-factor authentication, slow that down substantially.
Segment the network. If everything can reach everything, one compromised machine reaches everything. Segmentation does not prevent the intrusion; it decides how much of the organisation is in it.
Log, and have somebody look. The intrusion is present for days. Detection requires that logs exist, are kept, and are watched by someone — whether that is your own team or a service.
And have a plan you have rehearsed. Not a document. A rehearsal, with the people who would actually be in the room, including the question of how you communicate when email is unavailable.
The first hours
What happens in the first few hours shapes the whole incident, and the instincts that feel right are often wrong.
Do not turn everything off at the mains. Isolate affected systems from the network, but powering down can destroy evidence held in memory and sometimes the keys needed for recovery. Disconnect, do not destroy.
Assume the attacker is still inside and reading. They may have access to email and chat. Move incident communication to a channel they do not control — phones, a separate messaging service, in person. Organisations have had their response plans read by the people they were responding to.
Preserve what you can. Logs, images of affected machines, the ransom note itself, the file extensions, any addresses given. This material determines what you can later learn about what was taken, which is the question regulators and customers will ask.
Work out what was taken, not only what was locked. The breach question is usually more consequential than the outage. Which systems were accessed, what data they held, and whose it was.
Start the clock on notifications. Data protection law may require notification to the authority and to affected people within a defined period — in Kenya, the Data Protection Act sets out those duties. The timescale usually starts when you become aware, not when you finish investigating.
Tell the right outsiders early. The national cyber incident response team, your regulator where required, your insurer if you have cover, and law enforcement. Early contact buys help and preserves options; late contact forecloses them.
And decide who speaks. One voice, one set of facts, no speculation about what was taken until it is known. The pressure to say something reassuring in the first hours is what produces statements that have to be corrected later.
Whether to pay
This is the question everybody asks first and almost nobody has thought about before the day it matters.
Paying does not reliably get you back. Decryption tools supplied by attackers are often slow, incomplete or faulty, and recovery still takes weeks. Organisations that pay frequently end up restoring from backups anyway.
And it does not un-steal the data. A promise to delete stolen data is a promise from somebody who has just extorted you. There are documented cases of victims being extorted a second time with the same material.
It may be unlawful. Where the group or the wallet is subject to sanctions, making a payment can breach those sanctions regardless of the circumstances. This has to be checked before any payment, and it is a legal question rather than a technical one.
It funds the next attack, and it marks the organisation as one that pays, which is a factor in being targeted again.
Which is not the same as saying nobody should ever pay. Organisations facing the loss of a life-safety system or the end of the business make decisions under duress that others can judge comfortably. What matters is that the decision is taken by people with the authority, with legal advice, with the sanctions position checked, and with the alternatives genuinely assessed rather than assumed to be impossible.
The decision is cheaper to make in advance. Who decides, what advice is required, what the organisation's position is, and under what circumstances it would change. Writing that down on an ordinary day is worth more than any amount of deliberation on the worst day.
And the best preparation remains the dull one. An organisation that can restore from backups an attacker could not reach, and that knows what data it holds and where, is in a position to decide. One that cannot is not deciding at all.
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Standards and frameworks covered
The published frameworks this course teaches toward. Saolix is not affiliated with, endorsed by or accredited by any of these bodies; naming a standard is a citation, not a claim about its author.
- NIST — Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity
- ISO/IEC — ISO/IEC 27001 Information security management systems
- MITRE ATT&CK — MITRE ATT&CK
Sources
The official documents this course relies on. Laws and guidance change, so check the current version.
- Ransomware guidance and resources · National Cyber Security Centre, United Kingdom
- #StopRansomware Guide · Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, United States
- Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity · National Institute of Standards and Technology
- Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act, 2018 (No. 5 of 2018) · Kenya Law
- Data Protection Act, 2019 (No. 24 of 2019) · Kenya Law
- Office of the Data Protection Commissioner · Office of the Data Protection Commissioner, Kenya
- ISO/IEC 27001 Information security management systems · International Organization for Standardization
- Guidance on ransomware payments · Office of Foreign Assets Control, United States Department of the Treasury
- MITRE ATT&CK · MITRE
- Europol Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment · Europol



